Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 48
Number 1 Fall 2013

pp.369-416

Fall 2013

The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why Immunity Under Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned and
Not Freely Given
Patricia Spiccia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why Immunity Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act Should Be Earned and Not Freely Given, 48 Val. U. L. Rev. 369 (2013).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University
Law Review by an authorized administrator of
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu.

Spiccia: The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why Immunity Under Section

THE BEST THINGS IN LIFE ARE NOT FREE:
WHY IMMUNITY UNDER SECTION 230 OF
THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
SHOULD BE EARNED AND NOT FREELY
GIVEN
I. INTRODUCTION
Barbra is halfway through her freshman year away at college.1 As
she attempts to adjust to her new surroundings on campus, hoping to
make new friends to ease her transition, someone in her dorm informs
her that she is featured on a website called JuicyCollegeDirt.com. She
enters her name into Google, and the first result is a link to a post on
JuicyCollegeDirt.com, so she clicks the link and is directed to the
particular post involving her.2 There, Barbra finds a picture of her with a
caption—anonymously written—that states:
“Barbra Balaney has
sexually transmitted diseases.” Below the main post is a large thread of
other anonymous comments, which include criticisms of her physical
appearance, claims that she uses drugs, and allegations that she is
sexually promiscuous and cheats on her significant other.
In a panic, Barbra begins navigating the website in search of a way to
contact the site and request removal of the false assertions. She finds the
site’s policy statement, which provides that, while malicious defamation
of character may be grounds for removal, the site does not guarantee that
it will remove the material upon request or that posts will be removed
within a certain time frame. In accordance with the site’s stated removal
procedure, Barbra requests removal of the material; however, the site
does not remove the posts. Barbra wants redress for the harm to her
reputation, but as a college student cannot afford the costs associated
with litigation against anonymous posters on the Internet who are likely

This hypothetical is fictional and solely the work of the Author and is used to describe
the legal issues presented in this Note.
2
GOOGLE, www.google.com, (last visited Feb. 28, 2013). Google.com is a search engine
service that assists users in locating material on the Internet. James Grimmelmann, The
Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2007). Anthony Ciolli explained that
individuals use Google.com to harm others, stating:
malicious individuals—knowing that their actions on the Internet may
have real-life consequences for the intended target—have begun to
“Google bomb” individuals by creating a large number of defamatory
messages about the target that are likely to show up in search engines
and be seen by prospective employers, dates, friends, and others.
Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online Marketplace
of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 154 (2008).
1
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judgment proof.3 Most importantly, Barbra wants the material removed
so that when people—such as future employers—search her name, they
are not directed to the posts. Knowing that the website was in the best
position to remove the material, but failed to do so, Barbra wants to sue
the website.4
The law as it stands today protects websites, such as the fictional
JuicyCollegeDirt.com, from almost all lawsuits involving content posted
by third parties; therefore, Barbra is left with no recourse for the damage
to her reputation.5 Unfortunately, this situation is a reality for thousands
of students across the country.6 Victims seeking removal of unlawful
material are often left with no remedy because the posters are typically
anonymous and section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”) immunizes Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) from almost all
claims involving third-party material on the Internet.7
See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Combating Cyber-Victimization, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103,
1131 (2011) (discussing obstacles for victims of Internet abuse, such as jurisdictional and
financial issues). “[M]any individual defendants may well be impecunious and, therefore,
effectively judgment-proof.” Id.
4
See Brian C. McManus, Note, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service
Providers, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 648 (2001) (explaining that victims of Internet
defamation seldom obtain adequate relief from authors of the material; therefore, victims
seek alternative types of liability). Although Barbra is not in a financial position to litigate
a claim, the website has a deep pocket, which makes litigation worth pursuing. See id. at
648–49 (“Deep-pocketed Internet Service Providers . . . who facilitate the dissemination of
[defamatory] information, are the most logical source of relief when the authors are
judgment proof.”).
5
See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 726 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (Barker, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen an anonymous speaker is the defendant, if plaintiff is not allowed to
learn the identity of the speaker, there is no other opportunity for relief.”); see also Jason C.
Miller, Who’s Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public and Private Figure Plaintiffs in
Subpoenas to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229, 243
(2008) (“The practical effect of [the] interpretations of section 230 of the CDA is to leave
Internet defamation victims with no deep pocket to sue.”); Cara J. Ottenweller, Note,
Cyberbullying: The Interactive Playground Cries for a Clarification of the Communications
Decency Act, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2007) (explaining that discovering the identity of
the individual responsible for the harmful material is challenging because Internet users
are cloaked with anonymity).
6
See Kimberly Quon, Note, Implementing a Standard of Care to Provide Protection from a
Lawless Internet, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 589, 614 (2010) (stating that attacks on the Internet
have become an epidemic (citing Ben Leichtling, Federal Laws Needed to Stop Cyber Bullying,
Harassment and Abuse, BLOGGER NEWS NETWORK (July 8, 2009), http://www.bloggernews.
net/121515)).
7
See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the current law related to ISP liability and defamatory
anonymous posts on the Internet). The definition of ISP includes “entities that host
websites, and entities that host message boards, auction sites, e-mail listservs, and Internet
dating services.” KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, Comment, “Minor” Online Sexual Harassment and
the CDA § 230 Defense: New Directions for Internet Service Provider Liability, 32 HAMLINE L.
REV. 207, 230 (2009).
3
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Individuals may not be able to prevent situations like the one
described above, but the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)
may alleviate the unfortunate effects such situations may have on
students by creating a division that would serve as a neutral
intermediary between the interests of individuals requesting removal of
defamatory statements, the posting individuals’ freedom of speech, and
the ISPs’ interests.8 Absent such a division, individuals like Barbra may
be left emotionally, personally, and professionally damaged by
anonymous postings on the Internet.
This Note encourages the FCC to create a new division to serve as a
neutral intermediary that evaluates claims made by potentially defamed
individuals and determines whether ISPs should be required to remove
particular postings.9 Before discussing this proposal, Part II provides a
brief history of defamation law and the distinctions that exist in the
characteristics of defamation law between traditional mediums of
expression and the Internet.10 Next, Part III analyzes whether victims of
Internet defamation have adequate methods to protect their
reputations.11 Finally, Part IV proposes a formal removal procedure
initiated by a victim of defamation through a neutral division of the FCC
that ISPs must abide by to earn immunity from lawsuits concerning
third-party content.12
II. BACKGROUND
The Internet is a medium unlike any before, allowing for instant
communication that can be accessed by anyone anywhere.13 If harm
See infra Part IV.B (advocating for a notice-and-takedown procedure involving the
FCC and explaining why it is superior to other alternatives).
9
See infra Part IV (advocating for a notice-and-takedown procedure that respects each
party’s interests).
10
See infra Part II (discussing the common law categories of liability and how section 230
and its judicial construction have exempted the Internet medium from such liability).
11
See infra Part III (asserting that the law, as it stands today, does not adequately protect
Internet defamation victims’ interests and that remedies suggested by other academics do
not adequately protect the interests of ISPs and publishers of material on the Internet).
12
See infra Part IV (proposing a removal procedure in which the FCC acts as a neutral
decision-making intermediary to ensure that truly unlawful material is removed upon
notice and lawful speech is not chilled in the process).
13
Jonathan D. Bick, Why Should the Internet Be Any Different?, 19 PACE L. REV. 41, 45
(1998). The Internet has become a major mode of transaction and communication today.
See Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility?: Lessons from the
DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 238 (2007) (referring
to the Internet as “the heart and soul of global culture and society”); Ryan D. O’Day, Note,
Rapists, Sexual Offenders, and Child Molesters: Who Is Your Romantic Match? Why Dating
Websites Should Perform Criminal Background Checks, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 341–42 (2013)
(discussing the evolution of the internet and the many ways in which people use the
8
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occurs, it is no longer exposed solely to a school or the local community;
rather, the damaging material is broadcasted worldwide and can be
accessed at all times, often causing more harm than ever imaginable.14
internet today); Quon, supra note 6, at 605 (providing statistics regarding Internet
transactions). Notably, 78.6% of the North American population uses the Internet today.
Internet Usage Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/
stats.htm (last updated Aug. 28, 2013). This is no surprise, as popular websites, such as
Facebook and YouTube have made it easier for individuals to express themselves
creatively and instantly communicate with others miles away. See Ryan M. Hubbard, Note,
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Communications Decency Act, 2007 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 345, 346 (discussing various websites that have become very influential).
Facebook.com is a social networking site that allows individuals to communicate with
others and create profiles that include personal information.
FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2013); see Richard M. Guo, Note, Stranger
Danger and the Online Social Network, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 617, 622–23 (2008) (describing
Facebook.com and how it operates). See also Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limts?
Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 122–23
(2012) (indicating that Facebook reached 750 million users worldwide in 2011).
YouTube.com is a website that permits individuals to upload video clips for the public to
view. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
14
See Stacy M. Chaffin, Comment, The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace: Online Peer
Sexual Harassment, 51 HOW. L.J. 773, 773 (2008) (explaining that, when the author was
younger and got bullied, she was able to escape it by going home but that children today
have no escape because when they get home they get bullied on the Internet); see also David
A. Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case Study of Cyber
Targeting, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 667, 667 (2006) (describing the Internet as “quiescent
anarchy” and asserting that it “often leaves victims in its wake”). For example, today
college students can and often do utilize gossip websites, such as CollegiateACB.com and
TheDirty.com, to anonymously post harmful statements about others. COLLEGIATEACB,
http://www.collegiateacb.com
(last
visited
Nov.
4,
2012);
THE
DIRTY,
http://www.thedirty.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2012); see Michael Burke, Note, Cracks in the
Armor?: The Future of the Communications Decency Act and Potential Challenges to the
Protections of Section 230 to Gossip Web Sites, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 232, 255 (2011) (“[T]he
operators of anonymous gossip board sites are often aware and even encourage third
parties to post content that may be defamatory.”). Although there is a wide variety of
college gossip sites, there are some features common to all of them such as implicit and
explicit encouragement of individuals to anonymously provide sensitive information about
their peers with a disregard for the validity of the messages. See Patricia Sanchez Abril,
Repu-Taint Sites and the Limits of § 230 Immunity, J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2009, at 3, 3–4
(describing “repu-taint” sites and commonalities among them).
For example,
TheDirty.com, a website in which individuals can anonymously provide “dirt” on others,
encourages gossip through its name alone. THE DIRTY, supra. Although the trend has been
that these websites eventually shut down, they are replaced shortly thereafter by other
websites with almost identical features and defamation issues. Burke, supra, at 254–55. For
example, after JuicyCampus.com shut down in 2009, supposedly due to lack of advertising,
anyone who tried to access the site was redirected to CollegeACB.com, which consisted of
the same types of posts. Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First
Amendment Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking
Sites, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 176, 177 (2009); see Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Note, Immoral
Immunity: Using a Totality of the Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1319–20 (2010) (discussing
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Factors, such as the ease of access and the cloak of anonymity make the
Internet particularly susceptible to harmful speech such as defamation.15
Therefore, Part II.A of this Note discusses defamation law and the
interests involved in such claims.16 Subsequently, Part II.B addresses the
common law theories of liability for entities carrying or republishing
third-party content.17 Next, Part II.C explores section 230 of the CDA, its
judicial interpretation, and how it altered the theories of liability for
ISPs.18 Part II.D discusses recent case law criticizing section 230.19 Last,
Part II.E investigates previously suggested remedies for assisting victims
of Internet harm in mitigating the damage to their reputations.20

JuicyCampus.com and how it operated). CollegeACB.com remained in business until 2012
when it too met its demise; however, soon thereafter an extremely similar site,
CollegiateACB.com, came into being and is currently beginning to flourish on college
campuses throughout the nation. COLLEGIATEACB, supra (providing a list of over 200
universities represented on the website and the number of posts and topics involving each
respective university).
15
See Paul Ehrlich, Communications Decency Act § 230, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 401, 401
(2002) (providing characteristics of the Internet responsible for a prevalence in harmful
speech and discussing the problems related to regulating harmful speech in the Internet
medium); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 385 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that anonymity “facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability”);
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L. REV. 335, 336
(2005) (“Cyberspace offers unscrupulous people an entirely new venue in which to conduct
harmful activities without a significant chance of being identified, let alone punished.”);
Matthew Altenberg, Comment, Playing the Mysterious Game of Online Love: Examining an
Emerging Trend of Limiting § 230 Immunity of the Communications Decency Act and the Effects
on E-Dating Websites, 32 PACE L. REV. 922, 941 (2012) (“The concept behind the Internet has
been to facilitate unrestricted conversations between actors with little regulation or
oversight. Therefore, this environment is conditioned for deception, rumors, slander, and
intentional misrepresentations involving real humans and imaginary humans.” (footnote
omitted)); Sarah Jameson, Comment, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech
and Privacy, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 239 (2008) (asserting that, with less
accountability, individuals are more likely to act in an unsavory manner).
16
See infra Part II.A (discussing the First Amendment interests involved with
defamation and online speech).
17
See infra Part II.B (exploring the various theories of common law liability for entities
re-publishing third-party content and the rationale for each theory).
18
See infra Part II.C (explaining that the CDA and its broad judicial construction have
eliminated the common law theories of liability for most claims involving re-publishing of
third-party content on the Internet).
19
See infra Part II.D (discussing concerns the judiciary has recently expressed regarding
section 230’s broad construction, including concerns regarding the absence of a takedown
procedure).
20
See infra Part II.E (examining previous suggestions, such as using self-help remedies,
amending section 230, and repealing section 230 altogether).
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A. Defamation and the First Amendment Interests at Stake
Defamation is the cause of action most commonly associated with
section 230 of the CDA.21 Defamation law has been referred to as a “tugof-war” between two fundamental rights—the plaintiff’s right to her
reputation and a defendant’s First Amendment right to free speech.22
The First Amendment to the Constitution protects, among other things,
an individual’s right to speak freely or to refrain from speaking at all.23
In discussing First Amendment protection, the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that it “accords greater weight to the value of free
speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”24 The main theory behind
broad free speech protection is that in a society where all types of speech
contribute to the market place of ideas, the truth will be unveiled.25
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the freedom to publish
anonymously is within the First Amendment’s free speech protections.26
21
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that it is not
surprising that “[t]he cause of action most frequently associated with the cases on section
230 is defamation” because section 230 was enacted in response to a defamation case); see,
e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com., Inc.,
339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir.
1997); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011); see also
Altenberg, supra note 15, at 929 (explaining that the most common type of claims involving
section 230 “are speech based torts, such as misrepresentation and defamation”); Joshua
Dubnow, Comment, Ensuring Innovation as the Internet Matures: Competing Interpretations of
the Intellectual Property Exception to the Communications Decency Act Immunity, 9 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 297, 297 (2010) (“Because much of what is written in blogs and on message
boards is done anonymously, internet services and websites have quickly garnered
negative and defamatory postings about individual non-public people.”). It is important to
note, however, that the scope of the law covers a wide variety of causes of action, which
will be discussed in more depth in Part II.C.2.
22
Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 239; see Amanda Groover Hyland, The Taming of
the Internet: A New Approach [to] Third-Party Internet Defamation, 31 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 79, 109–10 (2008) (discussing the First Amendment interests at stake in Internet
defamation cases involving section 230).
23
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (holding that the state could not punish
citizens for refusing to display the motto “live free or die” on their license plates).
Specifically, the First Amendment states, in part, that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has made
clear that the First Amendment’s protections extend wholly to communications on the
Internet. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
24
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (citing Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
25
See Hyland, supra note 22, at 110–11 (discussing the marketplace of ideas theory).
26
See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200 (1999);
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342 (“[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of
the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 64–65 (1960); see also Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Ct. App. 2008)
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The Court has reasoned that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the tyranny of
the majority,” allowing more information to enter the market place of
ideas because it protects individuals from retaliation for disseminating
information that society may not agree with.27 Therefore, courts have
carefully preserved Internet users’ right to speak anonymously.28 As a
result, ISPs are not required to disclose anonymous posters’ identities,
and individuals seeking the identities of anonymous authors of online
speech often have to obtain court orders to compel the release of such
information.29
Although the Supreme Court has indicated that it greatly values free
speech, the Court has also indicated that the First Amendment right to

(“Judicial recognition of the constitutional right to publish anonymously is a longstanding
tradition.”). The Court has come to the conclusion that the framers intended to protect
anonymous speech because the Federalist Papers were published under fictitious names, so
anonymous publication traces back to the actual ratification of the U.S. Constitution.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342; Miller, supra note 5, at 248–49 (“[T]he Court recognized a long
history of anonymous speech in this country (going back to the Federalist Papers) and
afforded such speech constitutional protection.”). In McIntyre, the Court held that a statute
prohibiting anonymous distribution of campaign literature violated the First Amendment.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357.
27
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342, 357. The Court further asserted that anonymity “provides a
way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge
her message simply because they do not like its proponent.” Id. at 342. Additionally, the
Court provided examples of well-known writers that wrote under pseudonyms, noting
that “[g]reat works of literature have frequently been produced by authors writing under
assumed names.” Id. at 341 & n.4 (explaining that Mark Twain’s name is actually Samuel
Langhorne Clemens and Voltaire’s name is Francois Marie Arouet).
28
See Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 720–21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (asserting that a
plaintiff seeking to compel disclosure of an individual’s identity must be subject to a higher
standard because the order would constitute a mandatory injunction, and “an unmasked
anonymous speaker cannot later obtain relief from the order should the party seeking the
speaker’s identity not prevail on the merits of the lawsuit”); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 241
(stating that some courts have exercised heightened scrutiny of a plaintiff’s claim prior to
disclosure of a speaker’s identity (citing Dendrite Int’l., Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001))). Although the right to speak anonymously is carefully
preserved, courts have varied regarding the applicable standard for compelling disclosure.
See Erik P. Lewis, Note, Unmasking “Anon12345”: Applying an Appropriate Standard When
Private Citizens Seek the Identity of Anonymous Internet Defamation Defendants, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 947, 954–57 (discussing the variety of standards courts have adopted, such as the
motion to dismiss standard, the summary judgment standard, and the good faith
standard); see also, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460–61 (Del. 2005) (adopting a two-part
summary judgment standard); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 (articulating a four-step process
that has been termed the motion to dismiss standard).
29
Kraig J. Marton et al., Protecting One’s Reputation—How to Clear a Name in a World
Where Name Calling Is So Easy, 4 PHOENIX L. REV. 53, 61 (2010); see Miller, supra note 5, at
248–50 (discussing the process and challenges involved with John Doe suits seeking to
compel ISPs to disclose identities).
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free speech is not absolute.30 Notably, the First Amendment does not
protect defamatory speech to the same degree as most other speech
because the Court does not consider defamatory speech valuable in the
marketplace of ideas.31 The Restatement (Second) of Torts has defined
defamation as a communication that tends “to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him.”32 Although
defamation laws vary depending on the state, a plaintiff alleging
defamation typically must establish the following: “(a) a false and
defamatory statement . . . ; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third
party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of
special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication.”33 The extent of liability imposed on an entity that
30
See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (citing cases in which the First
Amendment has permitted the imposition of limitations on speech); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”).
31
See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (specifying categories of speech that do not raise
constitutional concerns, such as “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or ‘fighting’ words”). While defamation is not protected to the same degree as
most other categories of speech, it is not completely unprotected. See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that, to recover for defamation, public
officials must prove that the publisher acted with actual malice); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 580A (1977) (adopting the actual malice standard for public figures). The
rationale for the imposition of a higher burden of proof on public figures is that public
figures have greater access to channels of communication and thus, have a greater
opportunity to minimize the effects of the defamatory communication than private
individuals do. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
32
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining defamation and providing
types of disparagement that rise to the level of actionable defamation). There are two types
of defamation: libel and slander. Id. § 568; see Marton et al., supra note 29, at 55
(recognizing that libel was established overtime after courts determined slander failed to
adequately encompass the entire defamation tort). Libel is the publication of defamatory
matter through written or printed words; whereas, slander is the publication of defamatory
matter through spoken words. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977). However,
the distinction between the two causes of action rarely matters; therefore, most courts
generally refer to the cause of action as defamation, regardless of whether it is written or
spoken. Marton et al., supra note 29, at 55–56.
33
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). Regarding element (d), a statement
can constitute actionable defamation without proof of damages in some limited situations.
See, e.g., id. § 571 (asserting the standard for imputations of criminal conduct); id. § 572
(explaining the rule for imputations of loathsome disease and specifying that “[o]ne who
publishes a slander that imputes to another an existing venereal disease or other loathsome
and communicable disease is subject to liability without proof of special harm”); id. § 573
(providing the rule for imputations affecting business, trade, or profession and explaining
that “[o]ne who publishes a slander that ascribes to another conduct, characteristics or a
condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of his lawful
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republishes defamatory third-party content varies depending on the
medium used to transmit the information because, while most mediums
are subject to the common law framework, the CDA exempted the
Internet medium from the common law analysis.34 As a result, it is
instructive to gain an understanding of the common law framework that
is applied to non-Internet mediums.35
B. Common Law Framework
To better understand the application of section 230, one must gain an
adequate basis of the common law approach in assessing liability for
third-party content. The common law framework focuses on the degree
of editorial control that the entity exercises over the material at issue.36
business, trade or profession, or of his public or private office . . . is subject to liability
without proof of special harm”); id. § 574 (“One who publishes a slander that imputes
serious sexual misconduct to another is subject to liability to the other without proof of
special harm.”). Section 571 states:
One who publishes a slander that imputes to another conduct
constituting a criminal offense is subject to liability to the other
without proof of special harm if the offense imputed is of a type which,
if committed in the place of publication, would be
(a) punishable by imprisonment in a state or federal institution,
or
(b regarded by public opinion as involving moral turpitude.
Id. § 571.
34
Dubnow, supra note 21, at 300–01 (“Congress made a ‘policy choice by providing
immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in
making available content prepared by others.’” (quoting Robert T. Langdon, Note, The
Communications Decency Act § 230: Make Sense? Or Nonsense?—A Private Person’s Inability to
Recover if Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 829, 852 (1999))); see Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that Congress chose to treat the Internet
different from other mediums of communication). Several academics have taken issue
with the advantage websites have gained over traditional print media. See, e.g., Medenica
& Wahab, supra note 13, at 264–65 (suggesting that the distinction is not warranted because
the harm suffered is the same regardless of the medium used to impose the harm); David
R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (1997) (discussing the
distinction between legal treatment of printed letters to an editor and electronic letters to an
editor); Melissa A. Troiano, Comment, The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation
Laws Should Apply to Internet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2006) (criticizing the
“artificial distinction” section 230 created between the Internet and traditional print
mediums).
35
See infra Part II.B (exploring the three common law categories of entities involved in
assessing liability for third-party content).
36
Matthew G. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 is Outdated
and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet Service Providers,
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Fall 2007, at 1, 5; see Ryan French, Comment, Picking Up the Pieces:
Finding Unity After the Communications Decency Act Section 230 Jurisprudential Clash, 72 LA.
L. REV. 443, 453 (2012) (stating that the distinction between each type of common law
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The burden a plaintiff must satisfy to succeed in a suit against an entity
that disseminates third-party content depends on whether the entity’s
status is that of a common carrier, publisher, or distributor.37
A common carrier passively provides a forum for third-party speech
without editorial control; therefore, it is not liable for information it
transmits.38 In contrast, a publisher exercises editorial control over the
third-party information and thus is subject to liability for the content of
the speech.39 Distributors, such as libraries, are held liable only upon a
plaintiff’s showing that the distributors had actual or constructive
knowledge of the unlawful nature of the material.40 Distributors are
liability depends on the degree of knowledge each type of entity has regarding the material
at issue); Brian J. McBrearty, Comment, Who’s Responsible? Website Immunity Under the
Communications Decency Act and the Partial Creation or Development of Online Content, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (“The distinction between publishers and distributors under
the common law recognizes that increased control over content begets increased exposure
to liability.”); Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party
Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 656 (2002)
(“The duty of care and liability increases as the discretion that the disseminator has over
the published information increases.”).
37
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 3–4 (citing Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Liability of Internet
Service Provider for Internet or E–mail Defamation, 84 A.L.R. 5TH 169, 177 (2000)); see Colby
Ferris, Student Article, Communication Indecency: Why the Communications Decency Act, and
the Judicial Interpretation of It, Has Led to a Lawless Internet in the Area of Defamation, 14 BARRY
L. REV. 123, 123–26 (2010) (discussing the common law theories of liability and providing
examples of each); Ryan Gerdes, Note, Scaling Back § 230 Immunity:
Why the
Communications Decency Act Should Take a Page from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s
Service Provider Immunity Playbook, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 653, 656–57 (2012) (explaining the
rationale behind each type of entity’s common law liability); Troiano, supra note 34, at 1453
(describing the three common law theories of liability for entities that publish third-party
content).
38
See Bryan J. Davis, Comment, Comment: Untangling the “Publisher” Versus “Information
Content Provider” Paradox of 47 U.S.C. § 230: Toward a Rational Application of the
Communications Decency Act in Defamation Suits Against Internet Service Providers, 32 N.M. L.
REV. 75, 79–80 (explaining the rationale for the common carrier standard of liability);
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 3–4 (“A common carrier has no editorial control over the
information it carries, such as a telephone company, which has no control over the content
of the calls that pass through it.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. f
(1977) (discussing the type of liability applicable to a party responsible for the transmission
of third-party messages); RICHARD A. SPINELLO, REGULATING CYBERSPACE 135 (2002)
(discussing common carrier liability).
39
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, 810 (5th
ed. 1984); see Sheridan, supra note 34, at 168 (explaining the similarities and distinguishing
factors between publishers and distributors); French, supra note 36, at 452–53 (describing
and providing examples of publishers); Hattie Harman, Note, Drop-Down Lists and the
Communications Decency Act: A Creation Conundrum, 43 IND. L. REV. 143, 146 (2009)
(discussing common law publisher liability).
40
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The
requirement that a distributor must have knowledge of the contents of a publication before
liability can be imposed for distributing that publication is deeply rooted in the First
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subject to limited liability due to concerns that it would be too
burdensome for them to read every publication prior to sale or
distribution and that liability would result in excessive censorship.41
While almost all providers of third-party content are subject to liability
depending on the above categories, Congress, through the CDA, has
made the Internet an exception.42
C. Section 230 of the CDA: How It Came to Be and What It Has Become
Section 230 of the CDA protects ISPs from incurring liability for
third-party content on the Internet.43 The statute’s language contains
some ambiguities; therefore, the judiciary has attempted to discern
Congress’s intentions, interpreting section 230 accordingly.44 Part II.C.1
Amendment . . . .”); Jeweler, supra note 36, at 4; see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152–55
(1959) (invalidating an ordinance that imposed liability on booksellers for possession of
obscene books despite booksellers lacking knowledge as to the books’ contents); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. e. (1977) (adopting the distributor standard of
liability for bookstores and libraries).
41
Smith, 361 U.S. at 153–54. Some examples of distributors are libraries, newsstands,
and booksellers. See French, supra note 36, at 53 (discussing and providing examples of
distributors).
42
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003) (“There is no reason inherent in
the technological features of cyberspace why . . . [the] law should apply differently in
cyberspace than in the brick and mortar world. Congress, however, has chosen for policy
reasons to immunize from liability for defamatory or obscene speech ‘providers and users
of interactive computer services’ when the defamatory or obscene material is ‘provided’ by
someone else.”); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Internet publishers are treated differently from corresponding publishers in print,
television and radio.”).
43
Peter Adamo, Comment, Craigslist, the CDA, and Inconsistent International Standards
Regarding Liability for Third-Party Postings on the Internet, PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE
COMPANION, Feb. 2011, at 1, 2; Emily K. Fritts, Note, Internet Libel and the Communications
Decency Act: How the Courts Erroneously Interpreted Congressional Intent with Regard to
Liability of Internet Service Providers, 93 KY. L.J. 765, 773 (2004–2005).
44
Eric Weslander, Comment, Murky “Development”: How the Ninth Circuit Exposed
Ambiguity Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers Should Worry
[Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 284 (2008). Because courts have had to interpret much of
section 230, it is important to note the methods courts generally use to interpret statutes.
See id. (explaining that, because section 230 is ambiguous, “a debate rages” regarding what
Congress actually intended). There are three levels of analysis involved in the traditional
approach to statutory interpretation, each seeking to discern the legislature’s intent and
meaning regarding the statute. See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 353–58 (discussing
approaches to statutory interpretation and analyzing how each approach works). First, a
court will look directly at “the text and context of the statutory provision.” Id. at 353. If the
intent is unclear from the provision’s text, the court will consider its legislative history. Id.
If the legislative history fails to provide an answer as to the legislature’s intent, courts may
consider canons of statutory interpretation. Id. “[C]anons are general rules created by the
judiciary in an attempt to provide uniform guidelines by which a statute can be interpreted
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discusses section 230’s legislative history.45 Next, Part II.C.2 explores
how courts have interpreted section 230.46
1.

The Legislative History of Section 230 of the CDA

Congress enacted section 230 the CDA as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.47 Soon after a Time Magazine cover
story brought attention to the large array of offensive material on the
Internet, Senator Exon introduced a draft of section 223 of the CDA in an
effort to protect children from sexually explicit content.48 While Senator
in the absence of any more concrete guidance or authority on point.” Id. at 357. One
notable canon is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which stands for the proposition that,
when certain terms have been explicitly stated in a statute, it may be implied that the
statute is inapplicable to terms that have been excluded from the legislation. 73 AM. JUR.
2D Statutes § 120 (2012). Another canon is in pari materia, which provides that, when two or
more parts of a statute concern the same subject, they must be “construed together so that
all parts of the statutory scheme are given effect.” Id. § 95. Similarly, it is important to
consider the rule against surplusage. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 88 (2009) (describing the rule against surplusage); see also
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (criticizing the concurrence for violating
“the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be
entirely redundant” (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979); Jarecki v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–539
(1955))); Gregory M. Dickinson, Note, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 869–70
(2010) (discussing the rule against surplusage and its applicability to section 230 of the
CDA). The rule against surplusage provides that, “if an interpretation of given statutory
words would produce a meaning that was duplicative of other statutory language, it is
presumed that this is not the correct interpretation.” CROSS, supra.
45
See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining Congress’s motivation for enacting section 230 of the
CDA).
46
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the judiciary’s broad construction of section 230 of the
CDA and its reasons for doing so).
47
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026; Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 246–47. The CDA was
part of an overall amendment to the Communications Act of 1934. David S. Ardia, Free
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 409 (2010).
48
See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency
Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 57 (1996)
(“The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is to provide much
needed protection for children.” (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995))).
Time Magazine featured a front page exclusive of a pornography study (“Rimm study”)
performed by a Carnegie Mellon University researcher named Marty Rimm. Id. at 53–54
(citing Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by
Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J. 1849
(1995)). In his study, Rimm asserted that pornographic images comprised 83.5% of the
images on the Internet. Rimm, supra, at 1867; see Cannon, supra, at 54–57 (providing
background on the Rimm study and explaining the study’s involvement in the CDA’s
legislative history). The Rimm study was heavily criticized, and Time Magazine even
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Exon’s ultimate goal was uncontested, his method of achieving that
goal—namely through FCC regulation—was not well received by some
Congressmen.49 Specifically, Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron
Wyden introduced the Online Family Empowerment Act (“Cox-Wyden
Amendment”), which was a defensive provision expressly rejecting FCC
interference.50 Although juvenile access to pornography was the initial
issue Congress sought to address, the Cox-Wyden Amendment tackled
several other concerns that Congressmen had with the emergence of the
Internet—such as two recent court applications of traditional defamation
law to the Internet, which disincentivised removal of offensive
material.51
published a follow-up article that one scholar has considered “all but a retraction and
apology for being duped into publishing the study.” Cannon, supra, at 55–56 (discussing
the problems related to the Rimm study, such as the lack of peer review, plagiarism, and
allegations of ethical violations). In support of his draft of the CDA, Senator Exon also
introduced, and often cited to, his “blue book,” which was a folder containing
pornographic material that was accessible to children via the Internet. David Lukmire,
Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v.
America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371, 374 (2010). He sought to keep the
Internet from becoming a “red light district.” Ardia, supra note 47, at 409–10.
49
141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Christopher
Cox). The FCC is an independent federal government agency that regulates national and
international communications by methods, such as radio, television, satellite, and cable.
What We Do, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/what-we-do (last visited Feb.
26, 2013). It was created by Congress under the Communications Act of 1934, and
Congress continues to oversee the agency today. Id. On its website, the FCC states that its
work involves the following:
[p]romoting competition, innovation, and investment in broadband
services and facilities; [s]upporting the nation’s economy by ensuring
an appropriate competitive framework for the unfolding of the
communications revolution; [e]ncouraging the highest and best use of
spectrum domestically and internationally; [r]evising media
regulations so that new technologies flourish alongside diversity and
localism; [p]roviding leadership in strengthening the defense of the
nation’s communications infrastructure.
Id. The FCC is composed of offices and bureaus that implement regulatory programs,
encourage the development of innovative services, and investigate and analyze complaints.
Id.
50
141 CONG. REC. H8468–69. The proposed Cox-Wyden Amendment had a section
entitled “FCC Regulation of the Internet and other Interactive Computer Services
Prohibited.” Id. at H8469. Representative Wyden emphasized that, “parents and families
are better suited to guard the portals of cyberspace and protect our children than our
Government bureaucrats.” Id. at H8470. He then proceeded to show his fellow
Congressmen a few pieces of emerging technology that enabled parents to block
pornography on their children’s computers, arguing that the private sector should solve
the problem rather than the Government. Id.
51
141 CONG. REC. H8469–70; see Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (classifying CompuServe as a distributor and granting it summary
judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding what
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First, in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., a New York district court held
that ISP CompuServe was not liable for a third party’s defamatory
statement, reasoning that it was a mere distributor that did not exercise
editorial control over the material or have actual or constructive
knowledge of its defamatory nature.52 In contrast, the Supreme Court of
New York held an ISP liable for a third party’s defamatory statements in
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., reasoning that the ISP was
subject to publisher liability because it filtered the content in efforts to
block obscenity from its network.53 The Stratton court distinguished
Prodigy from CompuServe, explaining that Prodigy’s “conscious choice,
to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater
liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that make no
such choice.”54 Hence, the Stratton court inadvertently encouraged ISPs
to refrain from self-regulating to avoid liability.55
“CompuServe knew or had reason to know” about the alleged defamatory statements);
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995) (holding that making decisions that control the content on internet bulletin boards
constitutes editorial control which opened the defendant up to greater liability), superseded
by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); see also Mark G. Materna, Protecting Generation Z: A Brief
Policy Argument Advocating Vicarious Liability for Internet Service Providers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV.
109, 112 (2012) (discussing Congress’s intent in enacting section 230 and stating that
“Congress was prompted by two New York state court decisions that reached markedly
different conclusions”).
52
776 F. Supp. at 141. In Cubby, developers of a computer database for online gossip
filed a defamation suit against an ISP for allowing allegedly defamatory material written
by a competitor to appear on one of the ISP’s forums. Id. at 138. Notably, CompuServe
contracted management duties for the forum’s content to an independent company and did
not have the opportunity to review the contents of the publication prior to its release. Id. at
137.
53
1995 WL 323710, at *4–5 (“By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and ‘bad taste’, for
example, PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to content, and such decisions constitute
editorial control.” (citation omitted)); see supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing
common law publisher liability).
54
Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. The court emphasized that Prodigy presented itself to
the public as having control over the content of its bulletin boards and that Prodigy
implemented an automatic screening program to affect its control. Id. at *4. As for
potential concerns, the court stated “the fear that this Court's finding of publisher status for
[Prodigy] will compel all computer networks to abdicate control of their bulletin boards,
incorrectly presumes that the market will refuse to compensate a network for its increased
control and the resulting increased exposure.” Id. at *5 (citing Eric Schlachter, Cyberspace,
the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differences in Computer
Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 87, 138–39 (1993)).
55
Hyland, supra note 22, at 98; Burke, supra note 14, at 239; Gerdes, supra note 37, at 659;
see Charles F. Marshall & Eric M. David, Prior Restraint 2.0: A Framework for Applying
Section 230 to Online Journalism, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 75, 78 (2011) (“Internet
companies found themselves in a seemingly untenable position—either take some role in
controlling the content on their website and risk significant legal liability for content they
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The Stratton decision laid the foundation for the Cox-Wyden
Amendment, which eventually became section 230 of the final version of
the CDA.56 The Congressmen sought to overturn Stratton and encourage
ISPs to self-regulate by shielding “Good Samaritan” ISPs from liability.57
Representative Cox stated that his Amendment would “protect
computer Good Samaritans, online service providers, anyone who
provides a front end to the Internet, . . . who takes steps to screen
indecency and offensive material for their customers.”58 To determine
whether section 230 has had the intended effect, one must consider both
the language of the statute itself and the judiciary’s interpretation of that
language.59
2.

Section 230 of the CDA and Its Broad Judicial Construction

The Internet has undergone many changes since Congress passed
section 230; therefore, courts have been left with the task of interpreting
section 230’s scope and application to the always-emerging methods of
did not write or take a wholly hands-off approach and lose all control over the content on
their website.”). As two scholars have noted:
the liability rules were discouraging ISPs from attempting to filter
problematic communications. After all, an ISP that refused to selfregulate was likely to fall under the Cubby analysis and be
characterized as a passive, and hence virtually immune, distributor.
An ISP that endeavored to filter, by contrast, was vulnerable to the
Stratton Oakmont line of reasoning and its associated legal risks.
Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 221, 250 (2006).
56
See Lewis, supra note 28, at 958 (“Congress passed the CDA in response to the Stratton
decision in 1995.”).
57
141 CONG. REC. H1130 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (“One of the specific purposes of
[section 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is
not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”); Materna,
supra note 51, at 114 (“Also paramount to Congress’s rationale in passing § 230 was that
creating such immunity would subsequently remove disincentives for self-regulation of
ISPs.”). Additionally, the Congressmen sought to promote further development of the
Internet. Ardia, supra note 47, at 410. However, several academics have contended that the
Internet is robust enough today that it should be exposed to the same liability as traditional
print mediums. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 44, at 874 (asserting that, because the
Internet has flourished, “it no longer serves any coherent purpose to treat defamatory
content in the print edition of the New York Times differently than that in the online
version.”); Jae Hong Lee, Note, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal: Defamation Liability
for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 491 (2004) (questioning
whether the Internet even needs protection from liability now that it “is no longer in its
infancy”).
58
141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
59
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the judicial interpretation of section 230, which has
been primarily broad).
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communication the Internet provides.60 The portion of the statute that
has prompted a great deal of litigation is section 230(c), which states:
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and
screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information
content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to
restrict access to or availability of material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available
to information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).61

See Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 247 (“As the Internet took on increasing
importance in the nation’s daily life, courts began to grapple with its implications.”).
61
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); Ashley Ingber, Note, Cyber Crime Control: Will Websites Ever
Be Held Accountable for the Legal Activities They Profit From?, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 423,
428 (2012) (“The language used by Congress in drafting Section 230 has led to a great deal
of litigation about who Congress intended to protect.”). Section 230 is missing one major
aspect of Cox and Wyden’s Amendment as originally introduced: part of the section
heading, “FCC Regulation of Computer Services Prohibited,” is conspicuously absent.
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (providing the statutory language of section 230), with 141
CONG. REC. H8468 (Aug. 4, 1995) (identifying Congress’s intent in passing section 230).
Section 230(b) sets out the following underlying policies for the statute’s enactment:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other
interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
60
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Litigation has also occurred regarding the statute’s distinction
between two types of ISPs: interactive computer services (“ICS”) and
information content providers (“ICP”).62 Notably, the judiciary has
their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by
means of computer.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b). As for Senator Exon, his efforts produced section 223 of the CDA, which
criminalized the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent materials to anyone less than
eighteen years of age. See id. § 223 (outlining the now current language of section 223).
However, section 223 was instantly met with hostility, as twenty individuals filed suit
challenging its constitutionality the day President Clinton signed it into law. French, supra
note 36, at 451. Subsequently, the Supreme Court struck down section 223 as a violation of
the First Amendment free speech clause in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. 521 U.S.
844, 874, 879 (1997). The Court reasoned that, while protecting minors from harmful
speech is a valid government interest, section 223 of the CDA was not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 875, 879. The Court further explained that, in
an effort to protect minors, section 223 of the CDA impermissibly suppressed speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive. Id. at 874.
62
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)–(3) (defining ICS and ICP); see also Ingber, supra note 61, at 428
(contending that section 230 does not provide adequate assistance to courts in
distinguishing between the two types of Internet entities). To qualify for section 230
immunity: “(1) the defendant must be a provider or user of an ‘interactive computer
service’; (2) the asserted claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of
information; and (3) the challenged communication must be ‘information provided by
another information content provider.’” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003).
Many courts have struggled in determining what types of acts would render an ISP a
fellow content provider, precluding it from satisfying the third element. See, e.g., Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1166,
1170 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ISP became an information content provider by
requiring users to answer questions about discriminatory preferences as a condition of
participating in its housing services); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (holding that the ISP’s acts of
altering and publishing a defamatory e-mail from a user did not render the ISP an
information content provider); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th
Cir. 2003) (asserting that, regardless of the editing decisions, an ISP cannot be considered
an information content provider of third-party content); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v.
Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985–86 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the ISP’s act of deleting
some information from the third-party post did not transform the ISP into an information
content provider because it was merely engaging in traditional editorial functions). Section
230 defines ICS and ICP as:
(2) Interactive computer service[:]
The term “interactive computer service” means any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
(3) Information content provider[:]
The term “information content provider” means any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
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typically interpreted section 230 very broadly, almost always granting
immunity to ISPs.63
Although the legislative history and text of section 230 suggests that
the statute’s scope is narrow—applying only to defamation claims and
good faith efforts to self-regulate—the Fourth Circuit in Zeran v. America
Online, Inc. rejected such a narrow reading of the statute and instead
broadly construed the scope of section 230’s immunity to apply to claims
other than defamation.64 Additionally, the Zeran court rejected noticebased liability, eviscerating the common law distinction between
publishers and distributors.65
In Zeran, an anonymous third party posted a message on an America
Online (“AOL”) bulletin board advertising offensive t-shirts praising the
Oklahoma City bombing and directing interested buyers to contact
plaintiff Kenneth Zeran (“Zeran”).66 In response, Zeran notified AOL
about the hoax, and an AOL employee assured Zeran that AOL would

development of information provided through the Internet or any
other interactive computer service.
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)–(3).
63
See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 10 (asserting that courts have interpreted section 230’s
immunity very broadly); Eric Taubel, Note, The ICS Three-Step: A Procedural Alternative for
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act and Derivative Liability in the Online Setting, 12
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 365, 366–67 (2011) (“Courts have interpreted [section 230’s]
immunity in a broad and sweeping manner, making it nearly impossible for any plaintiff to
successfully hold an ICS liable for the tortious behavior of a third party.” (footnote
omitted)).
64
See 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information
originating with a third-party user of the service.” (emphasis added)); see also Lukmire,
supra note 48, at 385 (asserting that the court’s interpretation in Zeran was unnecessarily
broad).
65
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332; see supra Part II.B (explaining that publishers and distributors
are subject to different standards of liability for disseminating third-party content).
66
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. The advertisement included Zeran’s home telephone number,
which he could not change because he relied on the home telephone number for his
business. Id. The t-shirts had slogans, such as “‘Visit Oklahoma . . . It’s a BLAST!!!’” and
“‘Finally a day care center that keeps the kids quiet—Oklahoma 1995.’” Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 nn.3 & 5 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (1997). The
Oklahoma City Bombing occurred on April 19, 1995 and resulted in 168 deaths and more
than 500 injured people. STUART A. WRIGHT, PATRIOTS, POLITICS, AND THE OKLAHOMA
CITY BOMBING 6 (2007). The deadly explosion was caused by a homemade bomb, which
was placed in the back of a truck that was parked in front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building. Id. The bombing shocked the nation and was headline news for months not only
because of the death toll, but also because it was the work of a domestic rather than foreign
terrorist. Id. In fact, the perpetrator was a twenty-seven-year-old decorated Gulf War
veteran with no previous criminal record, which was even more shocking. Id. at 7. As a
result of the hoax, Zeran received numerous calls, which predominantly consisted of
derogatory messages and even included death threats. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
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remove the post but refused to post a retraction.67 After the offensive
advertisements continued to appear, Zeran filed suit seeking to hold
AOL liable for the third party’s defamatory statements based on a theory
of common law distributor liability.68 However, the court expressly
rejected the possibility of holding ISPs liable under traditional
distributor liability, explaining that distributor liability was a mere
subset of publisher liability and was thus barred by section 230.69 In
doing so, the court voiced its concerns that notice-based liability would
chill speech because it would prompt ISPs to simply remove the material
upon notice without engaging in a careful investigation as to whether the
material was in fact defamatory.70 The court emphasized that decisions
regarding “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content” fall
67
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. The following day, another similar anonymous Oklahoma City
Bombing-related t-shirt advertisement appeared, once again directing interested buyers to
contact Zeran. Id. Additional anonymous advertisements of the same variety began to
appear advertising items including bumper stickers and key chains, which still involved
offensive Oklahoma City Bombing-related slogans. Id. Consequently, Zeran repeatedly
called AOL and was informed by AOL’s representatives that the company would close the
account from which the material was posted. Id. Notably, within five days of the initial
advertisement, Zeran received a disgruntled phone call nearly every two minutes. Id.
Further exacerbating the issue, an Oklahome City radio station announcer relayed the
content of the advertisements on air and urged his listeners to call Zeran’s phone number.
Id.
68
Id. at 331; see supra Part II.B (explaining the theory of distributor liability). Zeran
argued that, although section 230 immunized ISPs from liability as publishers, section 230’s
immunity did not extend to AOL because it had knowledge of the defamatory content
contained in the posts and thus, was subject to distributor liability. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
69
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. Although the court recognized that liability varies depending
on whether an entity is a distributor or publisher, it nonetheless determined that such
differences still fall within the overall umbrella of publishers generally. Id. (citing KEETON
ET AL., supra note 39, at 803). In doing so, the court stated:
Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to
disseminate the writings composed, the speeches made, and the
information gathered by others may also be regarded as participating
to such an extent in making the books, newspapers, magazines, and
information available to others as to be regarded as publishers. They
are intentionally making the contents available to others, sometimes
without knowing all of the contents—including the defamatory
content—and sometimes without any opportunity to ascertain, in
advance, that any defamatory matter was to be included in the matter
published.
Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, at 803).
70
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see Lichtman & Posner, supra note 55, at 252 (“Because service
providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not for
its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon
notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal,
Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007–08 (2001) (asserting that a legal
regime imposing liability on an ISP for its subscribers’ acts will cause the ISP to purge
individuals who are liability risks from its system).
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within a publisher’s traditional editorial functions and that lawsuits
seeking to hold an ISP liable for any of those functions were barred by
section 230, thereby expanding the scope of section 230 immunity.71 The
decision and rationale in Zeran has played a prominent role in case law
involving the CDA to date.72
Shortly after Zeran, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia addressed section 230’s immunity in Blumenthal v. Drudge.73
Despite finding that the ISP had exercised editorial control over the
content of the material and that it would only be fair to hold the ISP
liable as a distributor, the court, relying on Zeran, held that section 230
immunized the ISP from suit.74 In its reluctant adherence to precedent,

71
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. Zeran framed his claim as a negligence action; however, the
court still determined that he was impermissibly seeking to hold AOL liable for traditional
editorial functions of publishers. See Shahrzad T. Radbod, Note, Craigslist—A Case for
Criminal Liability for Online Service Providers?, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 597, 600 (2010)
(discussing Zeran’s arguments to the court and why they were ineffective). “Artful
pleading did not take away from the fact that AOL assumed a role that Section 230
specifically protected.” Id.
72
See Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 254 (“[T]he Zeran decision paved the way for
ISPs, relying upon § 230 as a panacea, to ignore and even facilitate a variety of defamatory
and sometimes egregious behaviors.”); Jennifer Benedict, Comment, Deafening Silence: The
Quest for a Remedy in Internet Defamation, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 475, 490 (2008–2009) (“Later
cases rely on [Zeran’s] expansive interpretation in holding that § 230 proscribes the
treatment of computer service providers as publishers for liability purposes.”); see also
Bradford J. Sayler, Case Note, Amplifying Illegality: Using the Exception to CDA Immunity
Carved Out By Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com to Combat
Abusive Editing Tactics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203, 210 (2008) (asserting that in Zeran, “the
Fourth Circuit established a trend of broad [section] 230 ICS immunity”); French, supra note
36, at 457 (stating that, as of 2012, seven federal circuits had adopted Zeran’s broad
interpretation of section 230 (citing Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir. 2010); Doe
v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos,
Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418–19 (1st Cir. 2007); Green v. Am Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir.
2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v.
Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000))).
73
992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). In Blumenthal, White House employees Sidney and
Jacqueline Blumenthal brought a defamation suit against Matt Drudge and AOL after
Drudge wrote and published an allegedly defamatory statement about them on his
webpage entitled the Drudge Report. Id. at 46–47. Specifically, Drudge asserted that
Sidney Blumenthal abused his wife. Id. at 46. The Blumenthals implicated AOL because
when the alleged defamation occurred, AOL had a licensing agreement with Drudge, in
which AOL compensated Drudge for making the Drudge Report available to AOL’s
customers. Id. at 47. Pursuant to the licensing agreement, AOL paid Drudge $3000 each
month for access to the Drudge Report. Id. The licensing agreement permitted Drudge to
create, update, and otherwise manage the Drudge Report’s content; however, AOL
reserved the right to remove content that did not comply with its standards. Id.
74
Id. at 51–53 (“Any attempt to distinguish between ‘publisher’ liability and noticebased ‘distributor’ liability and to argue that Section 230 was only intended to immunize
the former would be unavailing.”).
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the court declared that “[i]f it were writing on a clean slate, th[e] [c]ourt
would agree with plaintiffs.”75
In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit further expanded the scope of
section 230’s immunity in two significant ways. First, the court found
that section 230’s immunity extended beyond just entities that provided
access to the Internet as a whole, emphasizing that “interactive computer
service” refers to “‘any’ information services or other systems, as long as
the service or system allows ‘multiple users’ to access ‘a computer
server.’”76 Second, the court determined that an entity does not forfeit its
section 230 protection based on its editing decisions, unless the entity
substantially alters the content at issue.77 The court in Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc. then interpreted section 230 even more liberally
than in Batzel, finding that “so long as a third party willingly provides
the essential published content,” the ISP is immune regardless of the
editing or selection process involved.78
75
Id. at 51. The court appeared to take issue with the fact that AOL took advantage of
all the benefits that the CDA had to offer without accepting any of the burdens Congress
intended; however, the court put aside its own opinion and adhered to precedent. Id. at
51–53. One scholar has criticized the Blumenthal holding, arguing that it exemplifies a clear
injustice, as there was absolutely no reason for AOL to have received section 230 immunity
when it actively selected, published, and even publicized the defamatory material. Jeweler,
supra note 36, at 23.
76
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1030. The court asserted that the language of section 230 confirmed
its finding “that services providing access to the Internet as a whole are only a subset of the
services to which the statutory immunity applies.” Id. In Batzel, handyman Robert Smith
(“Smith”) claimed that he overheard Batzel remark that she was related to a former Nazi
politician. Id. at 1020–21. Smith asserted that Batzel also informed him she was “‘the
granddaughter of one of Adolf Hitler’s right hand men.’” Id. He also stated that, on
another occasion, Batzel told him that she inherited a large number of paintings hanging on
her wall, which to him looked old and European. Id. at 1021. As a result, Smith became
suspicious that the paintings were stolen during World War II, so he e-mailed the Museum
Security Network (“Network”) to report his suspicions. Id. Subsequently, the Network’s
operator published Smith’s e-mail onto the Network’s website. Id. at 1021–22. Batzel filed
suit disputing Smith’s version of their conversations and contending that Smith defamed
her, not because he was genuinely suspicious about her art, but rather because Batzel
refused to pass Smith’s screenplay to her Hollywood contacts. Id. at 1022. The court
determined that the Network’s minor alterations to the e-mail were insufficient to render it
an information content provider. Id. at 1031.
77
Id. (“The ‘development of information’ therefore means something more substantial
than merely editing portions of an e-mail and selecting material for publication.”); see
Marshall & David, supra note 55, at 82 (relying, in part, on Batzel to explain that “courts
have . . . adopt[ed] a narrow view of information content provider”).
78
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
ISP could not be considered an information content provider “because no profile has any
content until a user actively creates it”). In Carafano, an anonymous third-party created a
Matchmaker.com profile of popular actress Christianne Carafano (“Carafano”). Id. at 1121.
The profile did not include Carafano’s name; however, it included two of her films,
pictures of her, her home address, and an e-mail address, which when contacted,
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Several courts, relying on Zeran, have repeatedly found that section
230 immunity extends to ISPs that have been requested to remove
unlawful material, but have refused or failed to do so.79 In Barnes v.
Yahoo!, Inc., Cecilia Barnes became the victim of a cruel Internet prank
when her ex-boyfriend created a profile online, which included her
personal information, nude pictures taken of her without her knowledge,
and open solicitations for sexual intercourse.80 After receiving several emails, phone calls, and visits from unknown men expecting sex, Cecilia
contacted Yahoo and informed it that she did not create the profile;
however, Yahoo did not remove the profile despite repeated requests for
it to do so.81 Months later, Yahoo’s Director of Communications notified
Cecilia that she would personally make sure that the profile was
removed.82 Despite the assurance, two more months passed, and Yahoo
had still failed to remove the profile; therefore, Cecilia filed a lawsuit
against Yahoo for its “negligent undertaking” in promising to remove
the material and failing to do so properly.83 The Ninth Circuit held that
section 230 shielded Yahoo from liability as to the negligent undertaking
cause of action, reasoning that “removing content is something
publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct

automatically replied “’You think you are the right one? Proof it !!’ [sic], and providing
Carafano’s home address and telephone number.” Id. As a result, Carafano began
receiving numerous calls, sexually explicit and threatening voicemail messages, and emails. Id. at 1121–22. Consequently, she filed suit against Matchmaker.com alleging
defamation, among other things. Id. at 1122. The court held that section 230 provided the
ISPs immunity. Id. at 1125.
79
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Friendfinder
Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 296 (D.N.H 2008); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of
N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011); see also McBrearty, supra note 36, at 835
(stating that it is “well established that § 230(c) immunity extends to interactive computer
services that refrain from taking any action with respect to offensive content”).
80
570 F.3d at 1098.
81
Id. Barnes even mailed Yahoo a copy of her photo identification and signed a
statement requesting the removal and denying having had any involvement with the
profile. Id.
82
Id. at 1098–99. Yahoo did so the day before “a local news program was preparing to
broadcast a report on the incident.” Id. Relying on the assurance, Barnes took no further
action in relation to the profiles. Id. at 1099.
83
Id. Barnes argued that her claim did not treat Yahoo as a publisher because the source
of the liability derived from the undertaking, not publishing functions. Id. at 1102. Barnes
contended that, although Yahoo did not have an initial duty to remove the material, its
agent undertook to do so, causing the duty to arise. Id. However, the court rejected
Barnes’s argument, reasoning that the action still involved treating Yahoo as a publisher
because the act that Yahoo allegedly undertook and failed to perform with due care was
the removal of content, which is a publisher’s duty. Id. at 1102–03.
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necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content
it failed to remove.”84
Section 230 also shielded an ISP from liability in Doe v. Friendfinder
Network, Inc., where an unidentified third party created a profile on
AdultFriendFinder.com using the plaintiff’s biographical data, birth
date, descriptions of her appearance, a nude photograph, and
information regarding her sexual proclivities.85 Despite the website’s
assurances to the plaintiff that the profile would be removed, in the
following months the profile began to appear as a teaser, with minor
modifications, on the defendants’ other websites as well as Internet
search engines and other third-party websites.86 As to the plaintiff’s state
84
Id. at 1103, 1105. Despite the court’s holding as to the negligent undertaking claim,
Barnes was not completely out of luck because the court subsequently held that Yahoo was
not immune under a breach of contract theory. Id. at 1109. In doing so, the court
distinguished the breach of contract claim, reasoning that “[p]romising is different because
it is not synonymous with the performance of the action promised. . . . Contract liability
here would come not from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest
intention to be legally obligated to do something, which happens to be removal of material
from publication.” Id. at 1107. Several scholars have criticized the court’s reasoning in
distinguishing the contract-based liability from Barnes’s negligent undertaking claim. See,
e.g., Lukmire, supra note 48, at 402 (criticizing the holding’s facial inconsistency with the
negligent undertaking portion of the opinion); Quon, supra note 6, at 608–09 (asserting that
the court’s reasoning in Barnes was extremely unclear, vague, and prone to further attacks).
Furthermore, critics argue that the Barnes court’s decision and reasoning will only result in
an even more substantial disincentive for ISPs to self-regulate, which is contrary to
Congress’s goal in enacting the statute. See Abby R. Perer, Note, Policing the Virtual Red
Light District: A Legislative Solution to the Problems of Internet Prostitution and Sex Trafficking,
77 BROOK. L. REV. 823, 834–35 (2012) (explaining that websites will avoid the Barnes holding
by ignoring removal requests altogether and thus, preventing any possible formation of a
contract or promissory estoppel claim); Quon, supra note 6, at 611 (“To any reasonable ISP,
this approach would appear to create an even greater disincentive to self-regulate its online
content . . . because any good faith action could potentially translate into a distinct and
independent legal duty as recognized by the Barnes court’s take on a contract theory of
recovery.”).
85
540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292 (D.N.H 2008). Adultfriendfinder.com describes itself as “the
World’s Largest SEX and SWINGER Personal Community.” Id. at 291. To experience the
website’s services, individuals had to register by entering a variety of personal information
to create a profile that other members of the community could view. Id. The profile at
issue in Friendfinder provided details that reasonably identified the plaintiff and stated that
she was seeking “Men or Women for Erotic Chat/E-mail/Phone Fantasies and Discreet
Relationship.” Id. at 292 (footnote omitted).
86
Id. Specifically, search engines displayed the teasers when users entered search terms
matching pieces of information in the profile, and third-party websites displayed the
advertisements when a user was located “near the Upper Valley region of New
Hampshire.” Id. at 292–93. The teasers directed Internet traffic to the defendants’ websites
through hyperlinks. Id. at 293. Some of the advertisements even directed users to sexually
related websites. Id at 292. The plaintiff alleged that the profile teaser deceived consumers
into believing that, if they registered for the defendants’ dating website, they could meet
her. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff took issue with the fact that the defendants did not take
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tort law claims, the court held that the defendants were immune from
liability, reasoning that “immunity depends on the source of the
information in the allegedly tortious statement, not on the source of the
statement itself.”87 Specifically, the court explained that, although the
defendants modified the content, a third party was the source of the
harmful material in the profile; therefore, the defendants could not be
held liable for merely re-posting the profile elsewhere, as doing so would
impermissibly treat the ISP as the publisher or speaker of the material.88
The same holding and reasoning applied to the ISP in Shiamili v. Real
Estate Group of New York, Inc. despite the fact that the website
administrator moved a defamatory third-party post from a discussion
thread to a stand-alone post, added an offensive image and new
language to the post, and refused to remove the content when asked.89
any steps to verify the accuracy of information posted on the websites and “‘took special
pains’ to ensure the anonymity” of individuals who posted on the website. Id.
87
Id. at 295. The court further asserted that the mere fact that the defendants knew the
profile was false and unauthorized when they re-posted it was insufficient to remove
section 230’s protection. Id. at 295 n.7.
88
Id. at 295. However, the court found that the defendants were not immune from
liability as to plaintiff’s claims for “infringement of her common-law right to publicity and
false advertising.” Id. at 306. The right to publicity has been defined as “the inherent right
of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.” Dubnow, supra
note 21, at 298 (quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer and the Right of Publicity: A
Tribute, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1703, 1704 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, it has been described as “an inherent property right of all individuals.” Id.
(quoting Matthew Minora, Comment, Rumor Has It that Non-Celebrity Gossip Web Site
Operators Are Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 821, 851 (2009)). Despite the broad immunity section 230 provides
for ISPs, Congress did carve out an exception for intellectual property claims, which states
“[n]othing in [section 230] shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006). But see also Lisa Marie Ross, Note,
Cyberspace: The New Frontier for Housing Discrimination—An Analysis of the Conflict Between
the Communications Decency Act and the Fair Housing Act, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 329, 374 (2009)
(advocating the removal of this exception to the CDA). Consequently, plaintiffs have
sought to place right to publicity claims into section 230’s intellectual property exception;
however, a uniform consensus has not emerged among courts regarding whether section
230’s intellectual property exception includes the right of publicity. Dubnow, supra note 21,
at 301, 304.
89
952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 1019 (N.Y. 2011). In Shiamili, the court held that section 230
precluded liability when a website administrator moved a defamatory comment from a
discussion thread to a stand-alone post and added an image of Jesus, which was comprised
of the plaintiff’s face and the words “‘Chris Shiamili: King of the Token Jews.’” Id. at 1014.
The initial comment suggested that Shiamili was racist and anti-semitic and mistreated his
employees. Id. As to the stand-alone post, the administrator gave the post the heading
“‘Ardor Reality and Those People’” with the subheading, “‘and now it’s time for your weekly
dose of hate, brought to you unedited, once again, by “Ardor Realty Sucks”. and for the record, we
are so. not. afraid.” Id. Notably, the parties were officers in competing real estate
companies. Id. Subsequent defamatory comments made by anonymous individuals on the
stand-alone post added to the sting of the initial comment. Id. Specifically, some of the
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While the majority of courts, such as the Shiamili court, have followed
Zeran’s broad interpretation, academic and judicial criticisms may signal
a new approach to section 230 claims.90
D. Section 230’s Immunity: Is It in Jeopardy?
Although most courts have construed section 230 of the CDA very
broadly, there have been some cases in which courts have raised
concerns and attempted to rein in section 230’s immunity.91 For
example, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook criticized the
Zeran court’s broad interpretation in both Doe v. GTE and Chicago
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights v. Craigslist, contending that providing
blanket immunity creates a disincentive because it is easier for ISPs to

additional posts included allegations that the plaintiff was in financial trouble, cheated on
his wife, and abused his wife. Id. After learning of the post, the plaintiff contacted the site
administrator requesting that he remove the defamatory material; however, he refused to
do so. Id. In response, the plaintiff filed suit against the website for defamation, seeking
damages and injunctive relief to discontinue publication of the material. Id. at 1014–15. As
to the defendants’ act of moving the comment to a stand-alone post, the court explained
that such an act does not result in forfeiture of immunity because reposting third-party
content falls within a publisher’s traditional editorial functions. Id. at 1019. Regarding the
rest of the post, the court recognized that, although the defendants were content providers
with respect to development of the heading, subheading, and illustration, such material did
not materially contribute to the defamatory nature of the original comment because “no
‘reasonable reader could have concluded that [it was] conveying facts about the plaintiff.’”
Id. at 1019–20. The court further explained that the illustration was “obviously satirical.”
Id. at 1020. In contrast, Chief Judge Lippman argued in dissent that “a reasonable reader,
viewing the heading and illustration, might very well have concluded that the site editor
was endorsing the truth of the appended facts, which asserted that [the] plaintiff was an
anti-Semite.” Id. at 1021 (Lippman, J., dissenting). He further asserted that the defendants’
attachment of the illustration alone should have precluded immunity. Id. Concerned with
the majority’s decision, Judge Lippman stated, “[w]hile I do not dispute the adoption of a
broad approach to immunity for on-line service providers under the CDA, an
interpretation that immunizes a business’s complicity in defaming a direct competitor takes
us so far afield from the purpose of the CDA as to make it unrecognizable.” Id. at 1022.
90
See infra Part II.D (discussing judicial criticisms and attempts to rein in section 230’s
broad protection).
91
See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an ISP forfeits section 230 immunity if it
materially contributes to the content’s illegality); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008) (expressing concerns
about whether section 230 even provides immunity); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660
(7th Cir. 2003) (asserting that Zeran’s broad interpretation appears at odds with Congress’s
goal of encouraging ISPs to self-regulate); Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex. App.
2010) (expressing concern regarding the absence of a takedown procedure in section 230);
see also Ingber, supra note 61, at 425 (asserting that judges are beginning to construe section
230 more narrowly).
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take the “do-nothing” approach.92 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
refused to grant absolute immunity in Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, reasoning that a website forfeits
section 230’s protection “if it contributes materially to the alleged
illegality of the conduct.”93 The court further reasoned that the CDA
“was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”94
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 670; GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; see French, supra note 36, at
454 (asserting that the Seventh Circuit has taken the narrowest view of section 230). For
example, in GTE Corp., Judge Easterbrook criticized the broad section 230 interpretation
from Zeran and its progeny, stating:
If this reading is sound, then § 230(c) as a whole makes ISPs
indifferent to the content of information they host or transmit:
whether they do (subsection (c)(2)) or do not (subsection (c)(1)) take
precautions, there is no liability under either state or federal law. As
precautions are costly, not only in direct outlay but also in lost revenue
from the filtered customers, ISPs may be expected to take the donothing option and enjoy immunity under § 230(c)(1). Yet § 230(c)—
which is, recall, part of the “Communications Decency Act”—bears the
title “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of
offensive material”, hardly an apt description if its principal effect is to
induce ISPs to do nothing about the distribution of indecent and
offensive materials via their services. Why should a law designed to
eliminate ISPs’ liability to the creators of offensive material end up
defeating claims by the victims of tortious or criminal conduct?
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660. Five years later, Judge Easterbrook once again criticized broad
section 230 interpretations, questioning whether section 230 even grants any type of
immunity. See Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d at 669 (“Subsection (c)(1) does not mention
‘immunity’ or any synonym.”). In doing so, he expressly rejected the proposition that
section 230(c) is a general prohibition against civil liability for ISPs. Id.
93
521 F.3d at 1168–69 (“A website operator who edits user-created content—such as by
correcting spelling, removing obscenity or trimming for length—retains his immunity for
any illegality in the user-created content, provided that the edits are unrelated to the
illegality.”). In Roommates.com, a housing website required subscribers to complete a
questionnaire that asked, among other things, the subscribers’ sex and sexual orientation,
as well as whether the subscriber has children. Id. at 1161. Roommates.com also required
subscribers to indicate whether they are willing to live with people of a certain sex, people
of a particular sexual orientation, or people with children. Id. at 1165. Therefore, the San
Fernando Fair Housing Council filed suit against Roommates.com for violation of the Fair
Housing Act (“FHA”). Id. at 1162.
Section 3604(c) of the FHA makes it unlawful to “make, print, or
publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national
origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or
discrimination.”
Sayler, supra note 72, at 207 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000)). For an in-depth look into
how Roommates.com functions as a website, see id. at 205–07.
94
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1164 (explaining that, if something is unlawful faceto-face or by telephone, it does not suddenly become lawful merely because it occurs on the
92
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Recognizing that its holding did not comport with the language of its
previous holding in Carafano, the Ninth Circuit conceded that in Carafano
it incorrectly suggested that a website may never be liable when a third
party creates the content at issue.95 In a departure from precedent, the
court asserted that, when a website materially contributes to the
illegality, it may still be held liable even if a third party supplies the
content.96
Additionally, in Milo v. Martin, the Texas Court of Appeals
expressed concerns regarding the absence of a takedown procedure
within section 230, stating:
We note our concern that section 230 does not provide a
right to request a website’s owner to remove false and
defamatory posts placed on a website by third parties,
and does not provide the injured person with a remedy
in the event the website’s owner then fails to promptly
remove defamatory posts from its site, at least in the
absence of extreme and outrageous circumstances . . . .97
Similarly, numerous critics have also voiced concerns regarding the
broad protection section 230 provides, arguing that the statute has failed
to achieve its main objective because ISPs receive immunity regardless of
whether they regulate, so they have no incentive to do so.98 Attempting
Internet). The court declined to decide whether Roommates.com actually violated the
FHA; however, the court noted that “asking questions certainly can violate the Fair
Housing Act.” Id.
95
Id. at 1171. The court further explained that “[p]roviding immunity every time a
website uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate the exception to
section 230 for ‘develop[ing]’ unlawful content ‘in whole or in part.’” Id.
96
Id. at 1168. Since Roommates.com, uncertainty has arisen regarding what constitutes a
material contribution that would render an ISP an information content provider, resulting
in forfeiture of section 230 immunity. See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952
N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. 2011) (“It may be difficult in certain cases to determine whether a
service provider is also a content provider, particularly since the definition of ‘content
provider’ is so elastic, and no consensus has emerged concerning what conduct constitutes
‘development . . . .’”); McBrearty, supra note 36, at 848–52 (discussing the three different
standards courts have fashioned, which are the essential published content standard, the
material contribution standard, and the traditional editorial functions standard).
97
Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 218 (Tex. App. 2010). Furthermore, in concurrence,
Justice David Gaultney asserted that, “[a] malicious website operator—one who
encourages anonymous postings and then intentionally and unreasonably refuses to
remove a posting known to be defamatory and easily deleted—joins in the activity the
[CDA] was intended to discourage.” Id. at 220 (Gaultney, J., concurring).
98
See, e.g., Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 254 (“[T]he Zeran decision paved the
way for ISPs, relying upon § 230 as a panacea, to ignore and even facilitate a variety of
defamatory and sometimes egregious behaviors.”); Gerdes, supra note 37, at 667
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to address these concerns, academics and courts have made several
recommendations ranging from self-help remedies to modifications of
section 230’s statutory language.99
E. Previously Suggested Remedies
Some academics and courts have argued that there are several selfhelp remedies, such as removal requests, confrontation, and counter
speech, which online defamation victims can employ to combat material
posted about them online without judicial or legislative interference.100
One group of scholars has suggested that the victim contact the ISP and
request removal of the material at issue, or otherwise, file an injunction
in court to have the material removed.101 Additionally, the same scholars
have recommended confronting the individual who posted the material
at issue and asking the person to stop.102 Last, some academics and
courts have advocated using counter speech as a remedial measure.103
(“Although Congress’s intent was to remove disincentives to self-regulation by ISPs—by
encouraging ISPs to edit or post third-party material without fear of being regarded as the
publisher of the material—§ 230 has failed to provide an incentive for websites to
regulate.”).
99
See infra Part II.E (discussing previously proposed remedies to combat the harm from
third-party posts on the Internet).
100
See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 (Del. 2005) (suggesting that the plaintiff reply to
character attacks to correct the misstatements); Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70, 77–78
(discussing confrontation and removal requests as possible remedies); Miller, supra note 5,
at 234–36 (discussing counter speech).
101
See Marton et al., supra note 29, at 77–79 (discussing removal requests and the
injunction process). Similar to the injunction suggestion, an obvious remedy is to pursue
defamation litigation against the third party; however, such litigation can be very
expensive and difficult, as the individual is often anonymous. Bradley A. Areheart,
Regulating Cyberbullies Through Notice-Based Liability, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 41, 42
(2007) (explaining that a victim’s pursuit of a legal remedy against the individual
responsible lacks any likelihood in success, as the user is often impossible to identify and
judgment-proof, making the high costs of litigation not worth pursuing). As one
commentator explained:
Proof would be next to impossible without a named
defendant . . . . Thus, plaintiffs face the difficult choice of deciding
whether the significant front-end litigation costs of an anonymous
Internet defamation lawsuit are worth the expense, particularly when
the revelation of the poster’s identity could lead the plaintiff to
conclude that an actual defamation suit is not worth pursuing.
Lewis, supra note 28, at 953–54.
102
See Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70 (discussing confrontation and the goals it can
accomplish).
103
See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (discussing self-help remedies and suggesting that the
plaintiff respond to the defamatory material and set the record straight); Areheart, supra
note 101, at 42 (contending that responding personally is one option used to confront the
harassment); Miller, supra note 5, at 234–36 (discussing counter speech as an alternative).
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The theory behind this particular suggestion is that the best remedy for
false speech is the truth.104 In addition to self-help remedies, scholars
have suggested modifying or repealing section 230 altogether.105
The most common modification to section 230 that academics have
suggested is the adoption of a notice-and-takedown procedure that is
almost identical to Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), which is entitled the Online Copyright Infringement
Liability Limitation Act (“OCILLA”).106 OCILLA provides that ISPs are
immune from liability so long as they do not have actual or apparent
knowledge of the infringing nature of the material; they do not benefit
financially from the infringing material; and upon notification of claimed
infringement, they rapidly remove or restrict access to the material.107
The notification from the alleged copyright holder is required to be
written and must include the following: (1) a physical or electronic
signature of the owner of the copyrighted material or his authorized
Advocates for counter speech suggest that victims respond by posting their side of the
story in the same place the original allegedly defamatory material was posted. Marton et
al., supra note 29, at 70. A similar proposition is an amendment to section 230 that requires
ISPs to provide a right of reply. See Michael D. Scott, Would a “Right of Reply” Fix Section
230 of the Communications Decency Act?, 4 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 57, 67–68 (2011–2012)
(advocating for a right of reply statute and contending that it is more beneficial than a
notice-and-takedown mechanism because the content at issue will still remain on the
Internet). However, it is difficult to predict whether a right of reply statute would be
upheld in the Internet medium because the Supreme Court has heard two notable right of
reply cases that produced opposite results. Compare Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974) (invalidating a statute that required newspapers to provide
reply time to election candidates), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969)
(upholding an FCC regulation requiring radio stations to provide reply time for
individuals to answer personal attacks).
104
See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (invalidating the Stolen Valor
Act, which made lying about receiving the Medal of Honor a punishable crime).
105
See, e.g., Jeweler, supra note 36, at 20 (advocating for the repeal of section 230 and a
return to the common law approach to liability for publishers of third-party material);
Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 263 (proposing an amendment to section 230 that
provides a notice-and-takedown provision).
106
See, e.g., David E. Hallett, How to Destroy a Reputation and Get Away With It: The
Communication [sic] Decency Act Examined: Do the Policies and Standards Set Out in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Provide a Solution for a Person Defamed Online?, 41 IDEA 259, 279
(2001); Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 263; Alison Virginia King, Note,
Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and
Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 878 (2010).
107
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006). In 1998, Congress passed OCILLA in an effort to address
emerging issues related to attributing liability for copyright infringement on the Internet.
Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized Copyright Protection
Over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 627,
629, 645–46 (2009) (“The principal purpose of [OCILLA] is to remove the Internet, or
perhaps more specifically ISPs, from the center of the battle between copyright holders,
unauthorized file-sharers, and other Internet copyright infringers.”).
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agent; (2) identification of the allegedly infringing material; (3) the
location of the material at issue; (4) “information reasonably sufficient to
permit the [ISP] to contact the complaining party”; (5) a statement that
the alleged victim of the infringement “has a good faith belief that use of
the material . . . is not authorized”; and (6) “a statement that the
information in the notification is accurate, . . . under penalty of
perjury.”108 Because this solution requires Congressional action to
amend section 230, some academics have sought to provide other
solutions that similarly result in removal of the material but can be
implemented quickly without reliance on Congressional action.109
For example, one scholar suggested applying an actual malice
standard of distributor liability to actions involving an ISP’s failure to
remove unlawful material.110 Specifically, the scholar suggested that
courts consider factors, such as the Internet forum’s procedure for
posting comments and the importance of the speech at issue, to
determine when an actual malice standard should apply.111 If a court
determines that the actual malice standard is applicable, the plaintiff
would be required to “show that the operator left the offending
statement online for an unreasonable length of time after the operator
knew it was false, or acted in reckless disregard of its falsity.”112 With
the commonly proposed solutions discussed above, section 230 would
remain intact; however one academic contends that the best solution is to
eliminate section 230 entirely.113 Specifically, Matthew Jeweler suggested
applying the traditional common law framework for publisher liability
of third-party content, but with a twist—subjecting the ISPs to an
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3).
See, e.g., Hyland, supra note 22, at 120 (using the courts’ reasoning in actual malice
cases to create a viable solution); Miller, supra note 5, at 240–42 (asserting that “any solution
requiring statutory change requires congressional action—something that is very difficult
to generate based only on scholarly, legal commentary” and subsequently suggesting
judicial remedies to avoid reliance on the legislature).
110
Hyland, supra note 22, at 120. Actual malice refers to statements made with
knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for whether they are false. N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
111
See Hyland, supra note 22, at 121 (explaining types of speech that would trigger the
actual malice standard). “Internet commentary about issues of political or social
importance falls within the stronger levels of constitutional protection and should weigh in
favor of applying actual malice.” Id.
112
Id. at 120–21.
113
See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 20 (“Congress should repeal the CDA and courts should
apply the common law framework to Internet defamation cases attempting to hold an ISP
or website operator liable under a publisher or distributor liability theory.”). Jeweler
argued that Congress did not intend to grant ISPs such broad immunity and that, in the
alternative, even if such was Congress’s intention, section 230’s immunity is no longer
necessary because Internet has grown immensely into an enormous medium. Id. at 21.
108
109
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objective “reasonable ISP” standard, in which the ISP will be liable if,
under the circumstances, it reasonably should have known of the
defamatory nature of the content.114
Although section 230 has garnered a great deal of criticism since it
was passed, it remains the primary source of protection for ISPs today.115
Despite the numerous proffered solutions for combatting the removal
issue section 230 has created, none of those suggestions have been
implemented.116 An analysis of the overall issues, law, and previously
suggested remedies will shed some light regarding why previous
suggestions have been unsuccessful in effectuating change and what
type of remedy would prove most effective moving forward.117
III. ANALYSIS
The proliferation of anonymous defamatory postings on the Internet
has forced courts and legislatures to engage in the difficult task of
balancing victims’ reputation rights with the First Amendment rights of
anonymous posters and the ISPs’ business interests.118 The legislative
history of the CDA and the judicial construction of the statute indicate,
however, that courts and legislators have afforded greater weight to the
anonymous posters and ISPs’ interests than those of the victims.119
114
Id. at 26 (explaining that the reasonable ISP standard will keep ISPs from simply
ignoring the content to escape distributor liability). In response to concerns that such a
standard would chill speech, Jeweler asserted that “not all speech is supposed to go
unregulated” and that “[d]efamatory speech that injures other individuals’ reputations is
precisely the type of speech that should be chilled.” Id. at 28–29. He further contended that
the concern that non-defamatory speech will be removed does not justify allowing
defamatory speech to go unpunished. Id. at 29.
115
See, e.g., Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 470–71 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that section
230 immunized AOL from suit because the plaintiff was alleging, in essence, that AOL
failed to properly police its network, which involved treating AOL as a speaker of thirdparty content); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com., Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2003)
(finding a computer match-making service immune under section 230 because it could not
be liable for false content posted by a third party).
116
See supra Part II.E (discussing proposed solutions that would help to narrow the broad
grant of immunity under section 230 since Zeran).
117
See infra Part III (analyzing section 230’s jurisprudence, contending that section 230
has failed to achieve Congress’s goals, and evaluating why previously suggested remedies
do not adequately protect the interests of the victims, ISPs, and individual posters).
118
See Richards, supra note 14, at 180 (“With the issue of Internet anonymity bubbling up
in courts and legislatures across the country, a showdown between reputation, privacy,
and safety interests on the one hand, and the First Amendment rights of message posters
and online service providers on the other, is inevitable.”); see also Medenica & Wahab, supra
note 13, at 239 (recognizing that the law has evolved into a “tug-of-war” between the
various interests at issue).
119
See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 27–28 (acknowledging that free speech should be
protected, but arguing that in enacting section 230, Congress impermissibly failed to
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Today, ISPs have immunity from suit for almost any action taken by a
third party regardless of the ISPs’ editing and publishing decisions in the
process, which leaves victims with very limited and often ineffective
remedies.120 First, Part III.A discusses the errors that have led to the
exceedingly broad interpretation of section 230.121 Next, Part III.B
analyzes why previously suggested remedies do not sufficiently balance
the interests of the victims, ISPs, and third-party posters.122
A. The Unintended Consequences of the Courts’ Broad Construction of
Section 230
Congress enacted section 230 of the CDA to remove the disincentive
created by the Stratton case and instead provide ISPs with an incentive to
self-regulate.123 However, the mere fact that Congress removed the
disincentive does not conversely mean that Congress also created an
incentive for ISPs to self-regulate.124 Rather, the case law involving
account for an individual’s interest in not being defamed in its quest to preserve free
speech); Richards, supra note 14, at 198 (“With technological advancements also comes the
opportunity—indeed the greater likelihood, given the expansive system—for more
widespread distribution of misinformation, but courts nonetheless often have found that
the value of allowing such speech outweighs the potential for adverse consequences.”);
Jameson, supra note 15, at 247 (explaining that on the Internet, an individual’s privacy is
given less weight than her ability to speak freely). As Matthew Jeweler correctly argued:
The conclusion one must draw . . . is that Congress would rather
promote speech on the Internet than have ISPs and website operators
be cautious about potentially defamatory speech. While free speech is
undoubtedly a matter of great public interest and should be protected,
Congress should not ignore the compelling competing interest when
considering this issue: individuals’ interest in not being defamed.
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 27.
120
See Hyland, supra note 22, at 82 (“Victims of egregious defamation have virtually no
recourse, as the original web publisher is often an anonymous individual that even if
identified, has few resources to compensate the plaintiff.” (footnote omitted)); Lukmire,
supra note 48, at 402–03 (providing several obstacles plaintiffs face that make it very
difficult for them to remedy the situation).
121
See infra Part III.A (explaining that section 230 has been misinterpreted and fails to
accomplish Congress’s goal of encouraging ISPs to self-regulate).
122
See infra Part III.B (evaluating previously suggested remedies and the flaws associated
with each).
123
See 141 CONG. REC. H1130 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (“One of the specific purposes of
this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which
have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”); Marshall & David,
supra note 55, at 78 (explaining that Congress “passed Section 230 in direct response to
Stratton Oakmont”).
124
See Hyland, supra note 22, at 113 (“By abolishing distributor liability in most
jurisdictions, courts have created little incentive for interactive website operators to
monitor their website content.”); Benedict, supra note 72, at 506 (emphasizing that
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section 230 indicates that, instead of expending time and money to selfregulate, many ISPs chose to do nothing while still benefitting from the
immunity shield that section 230 provides, thereby defeating the primary
purpose of the statute.125 The discrepancy between the statute’s main
purposes and its resulting consequences has been heavily criticized by
scholars and courts alike.126
1.

The Broad Interpretation of Section 230 Is Not Supported by the
Statute’s Language or Legislative History

Zeran is the most influential case in section 230’s jurisprudence, as its
overly broad construction of the statute laid the foundation for needless
expansive readings of section 230 that have virtually resulted in
unwarranted blanket immunity for ISPs.127 Despite a lack of support
removing a disincentive is distinct from creating an incentive); see also Quon, supra note 6,
at 600 (“[T]here is still a strong presence of lewd, offensive, and damaging material online,
free of any self-filtering efforts exercised by ISPs.”). As Matthew Jeweler correctly noted:
Congress has simply assumed that if it immunizes ISPs and website
operators from liability, then those entities will screen content for
defamatory material out of their own senses of altruism. It is
counterproductive to attempt to encourage these entities to selfregulate their content for defamatory speech by immunizing them for
that defamatory speech regardless of whether the ISP attempts whatsoever
to be responsible and screen its content. While we would like to think that
ISPs will screen their own content out of the goodness of their
corporate hearts, it is a risk that Congress has chosen to take without
any evidence. With this choice, Congress has put its faith in ISPs to
self-regulate and has cut off individuals’ ability to seek redress,
regardless of whether those ISPs regulate their content.
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 25–26 (footnote omitted).
125
See Hyland, supra note 22, at 115 (“[T]he cases that interpret section 230 to immunize
distributor liability create disincentives to police content.”); Benedict, supra note 72, at 493
(“The problem is, however, that § 230 does not require self-policing. These providers can
reap all of the benefits and are not required to perform any of the service Congress hoped
to encourage.”); see also, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009)
(providing immunity from tort claims despite the ISP’s failure to remove unlawful material
when asked); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 295 (D.N.H.
2008) (immunizing the ISP from a defamation suit when the ISP was asked to remove
unlawful material and instead, made it even more apparent); Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of
N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that section 230 barred suit against a
website operator for alleged defamatory statements made on the website by a third party).
126
See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that section
230 induces ISPs to take the “do nothing” approach, as precautions are costly and ISPs are
immune regardless of whether they self-regulate); Dickinson, supra note 44, at 870 (“The
majority view reads subsection (c)(2) entirely out of the text and in the process renders the
Section powerless to achieve its stated objective—encouragement of self-censorship.”).
127
Lukmire, supra note 48, at 385; see Materna, supra note 51, at 115 (asserting that Zeran’s
rationale created a “slippery slope” because subsequent courts relied on Zeran as precedent
and extended section 230 immunity to completely unrelated facts, broadening the statute’s
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from the statute’s language or its legislative history, the court in Zeran
bestowed immunity on ISPs for torts other than defamation and broke
away from a long-standing common law tradition, eliminating
distributor liability on the Internet completely.128 Section 230 only
references protection from publisher liability, which suggests that
Congress did not intend to immunize ISPs from distributor liability.129
Presumably, Congress was well aware of the different common law
standards involved in defamation suits; therefore, Congress’s inclusion
of publisher liability and failure to address distributor liability in section

scope); Ingber, supra note 61, at 429 (“Courts have consistently held, in a variety of contexts,
that Section 230 provides a broad and sweeping immunity to ISPs faced with civil liability
claims.”); Sayler, supra note 72, at 210 (explaining that section 230’s broad language has
provided courts with flexibility in interpreting the Act, and courts have typically erred on
the side of granting ISPs protection).
128
Lukmire, supra note 48, at 385; see Ottenweller, supra note 5, at 1312 (“[T]he Zeran
majority abandoned well-settled principles of common law defamation and led subsequent
courts down their misguided path.”). Two academics have argued that the Zeran court
erred in “assum[ing] that a mere accusation would be sufficient to trigger ISP liability”
because tort law merely compels that a distributor exercise reasonable precautions.
Lichtman & Posner, supra note 55, at 252–53.
129
Sheridan, supra note 34, at 168; see Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 251
(“Noticeably absent from § 230(c)(1) is an express mention of distributor protection.
Rather, the section sets forth protection only for ‘publishers or speakers’ of content.”). As
one commentator explained:
Nothing in the language of the statute suggests immunization from
distributor liability as well, otherwise Congress would not have
included “publisher or speaker” in the statute. Further, it would make
little sense for Congress to pass an act promoting decency on the
Internet by encouraging ISP self-policing efforts if an ISP could instead
choose to do no self-policing when notified of harmful content and
remain free of liability. Instead, the more likely intent of Congress was
to immunize ISPs that actively review and edit inappropriate content
while leaving others vulnerable to lawsuits if they “do not screen any
third-party content whatsoever.”
Lewis, supra note 28, at 959 (footnotes omitted). Similarly, another critic persuasively
argued that:
the placement of “speaker” alongside “publisher” suggests that
Congress meant for the statute to eliminate only primary publisher
liability for ISPs, but to keep distributor liability intact. Otherwise,
Congress would have also stated that ISPs should not be treated as
distributors in order to cover all relevant forms of defamation liability.
Ottenweller, supra note 5, at 1316 (footnote omitted). The maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius also supports a conclusion that section 230 does not apply to distributor liability
because the terms publisher and speaker were both expressly stated and distributor was
not, which implies that distributors are excluded from section 230’s protection. See supra
note 44 (explaining that expressio unius est exclusio alterius stands for the proposition that
expression of particular terms implies inapplicability of excluded terms).
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230 does not appear to be accidental.130 Yet, the court in Zeran wrongly
concluded that ISPs were protected from distributor liability despite
Congress’s silence on that issue.131 The Zeran court reasoned that
distributor liability was a mere subset of publisher liability; however,
such a conclusion is at odds with the common law custom of
maintaining a distinction between the two categories.132
Additionally, the Zeran court incorrectly considered promoting the
growth of the Internet to be Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the
statute, failing to recognize that Congress’s primary goal was actually to
encourage ISPs to self-regulate and remove offensive material.133 Last,
the rule against surplusage also provides support for the proposition
that cases further expanding Zeran, such as Batzel and Blumenthal, have
misconstrued section 230’s language.134 Most courts have interpreted
130
Lee, supra note 57, at 483; see Norby-Jahner, supra note 7, at 251 (“It seems highly
unlikely that, in light of Congress’s intention to protect children from inappropriate and
offensive online material and to deter harassing conduct, Congress would intend to
provide ISPs with immunity if they know about the material and refuse to remove it.”).
131
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997). See supra Part II.C.2. for an
in-depth discussion of the Zeran case.
132
See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 5 (explaining that there are three separate entities at
common law, each subject to different standards of liability); Gerdes, supra note 37, at 656–
57 (discussing the common law theories of liability and the rationale behind each type).
See supra Part II.B for an in-depth look at the common law distinction between publisher
and distributor liability.
133
Lukmire, supra note 48, at 389 (“[T]he court failed to consider that the end of
promoting speech on the Internet was arguably subsidiary to, or should at least be
considered in addition to, section 230’s overall purpose of providing ‘[p]rotection for private
blocking and screening of offensive material.’”); see supra note 57 and accompanying text
(explaining that Congress sought to encourage ISPs to self-regulate by removing the
disincentive created by the Stratton-Cubby paradox). Others, in accordance with Zeran,
have also emphasized that Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the statute was to
promote growth on the Internet. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir.
2003) (stating that Congress’s first reason for enacting section 230 was to promote
development of e-commerce and free speech on the Internet). Additionally, even if
promoting Internet growth was Congress’s primary goal, section 230 is no longer necessary
to achieve that goal, as the Internet has grown tremendously and has become “such an
important part of our society and our everyday life that there is no doubt that it will
continue to grow and flourish.” Jeweler, supra note 36, at 37.
134
See Dickinson, supra note 44, at 869 (criticizing the broad interpretations in Zeran and
Blumenthal, reasoning that they render subsection (c)(2) unnecessary); see also Ottenweller,
supra note 5, at 1310–11 (“By misinterpreting the meaning and purpose of the CDA, judicial
bodies have handed negligent ISPs ‘get out of jail free’ cards . . . .”); Patel, supra note 36, at
678 (asserting that “absolute immunity . . . is the result of a misinterpretation” of section
230’s language and Congress’s intent). According to the rule against surplusage, “if an
interpretation of given statutory words would produce a meaning that was duplicative of
other statutory language, it is presumed that this is not the correct interpretation.” CROSS,
supra note 44, at 88. For more information regarding rules of statutory construction, see
supra note 44.
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subsection (c)(1) as an immunity provision for any third-party content,
regardless of the ISPs editing decisions involved.135 However, if ISPs are
immune for censoring third-party content under subsection (c)(1), then
there appears to be no purpose in the good faith provision found in
subsection (c)(2), which independently provides immunity for ISPs that
censor third-party material.136 Accordingly, Zeran and its progeny
ultimately expanded the scope of section 230 far beyond what Congress
actually intended.137
2.

The Lack of Distributor Liability Has Prompted Removal Concerns

Many courts have followed the Zeran court’s refusal to impose
distributor liability on ISPs, resulting in ISP immunity in almost every
case.138 While cases such as Roommates.com offer a glimmer of hope for
victims, they are very narrow holdings that only apply in rare situations
when the ISP materially contributes to the illegality of the material.139
Today, ISPs still enjoy protection in instances where the ISP is asked to
remove offensive material and refuses to do so, which seems contrary to

135
See, e.g., Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (providing that editing decisions do not cause ISPs to
forfeit immunity); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com., Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)
(asserting that, regardless of the editing decisions involved, an ISP cannot be held liable as
an information content provider of third-party content); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (stating that
decisions regarding “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content” fall within
a publisher’s traditional editorial functions and that section 230 bars lawsuits seeking to
hold an ISP liable for executing any of those functions).
136
See Dickinson, supra note 44, at 869 (“If providers who choose to censor third-partycreated content are already immune under subsection (c)(1) because the content is not their
own, then what can be the purpose of subsection (c)(2), which grants immunity if they
choose to censor?”); supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing section 230’s
provisions and Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute).
137
Jeweler, supra note 36, at 36–37. “[B]y using the word ‘immunity’ to describe the
protection from liability § 230 conferred on ISPs, the Zeran court set a dangerous precedent
that would come to encompass many more internet operators than Congress presumably
intended to protect.” Zieglowsky, supra note 14, at 1312.
138
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (refusing to
apply liability when an ISP was repeatedly asked to remove unlawful material and failed
to do so); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 296, 298 (D.N.H.
2008) (relying on Zeran in its decision to provide immunity from some causes of action to
an ISP that republished third-party content despite the ISP having knowledge as to the
unlawful nature of the material); see also Ferris, supra note 37, at 130 (“Most courts around
the country have followed the Zeran analysis to the letter.”).
139
See Adamo, supra note 43, at 11–12 (contending that Roommates.com was not a
substantial change to the law concerning section 230). Specifically, Roommates.com has been
described as a narrow exception that is only applicable “where the ISP literally forces third
parties to post illegal content as a condition of using its services.” Id. at 11.
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Congress’s intention.140 Congress explained that it wanted to protect
self-regulating “Good Samaritans” in passing section 230.141 However,
the law as it stands today protects not only self-regulating Good
Samaritans, but also those ISPs that refuse to self-regulate; therefore, no
incentive exists for ISPs to behave like the Good Samaritans Congress
sought to protect when it passed the statute.142 Several cases, such as
Barnes, Friendfinder, and Shiamili, illustrate that, when asked to remove
allegedly illegal content, ISPs often refuse to do so or ignore the requests
altogether.143 In so doing, these ISPs join in the activity that section 230
was intended to discourage.144
The ISP’s failure to remove the content in Friendfinder suggests that
bad faith may have been at play. In Friendfinder, the plaintiff informed
the website that a profile claiming to be her was actually not hers and
requested its removal; yet, the ISP chose to make the profile appear as
teasers in areas outside its actual webpage, making the content even more
apparent.145 As Justice Gaultney explained in Milo v. Martin, bad faith
conduct should not be worthy of section 230 immunity because the

See, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098, 1103; Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 292, 298;
Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 1020 (N.Y. 2011); see also
supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress intended to encourage ISPs
to remove unlawful material from the Internet).
141
141 CONG. REC. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995).
142
Ottenweller, supra note 5, at 1320 (“Because the ISPs have no threat or fear of litigation
for defamatory materials posted by third parties, there no longer remains an incentive for
providers to screen for offensive and harmful material and the ISP is free to use its
resources on other profitable ventures.”); Patel, supra note 36, at 684 (“Common sense
dictates that an ISP will not waste its time and money monitoring content over the Internet
when it will suffer no repercussions from failing to do so.”); Quon, supra note 6, at 590
(asserting that section 230’s immunity does not provide an “incentive for . . . ISPs to selfregulate the appropriateness of the content posted” on their websites; therefore, the sites
are “blank canvases readily available for the actual parties to directly furnish inappropriate
material online”).
143
See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1098, 1103 (providing section 230 immunity to an ISP that was
repeatedly asked to remove unlawful material and failed to do so); Friendfinder, 540 F.
Supp. 2d at 292, 298 (allowing section 230 immunity when a plaintiff sought to hold a
website liable as a publisher of third-party information, even though plaintiff requested
that the website remove the content); Shiamili, 952 N.E.2d at 1014, 1020 (holding that an ISP
was immune from suit, despite its refusal to remove knowingly defamatory material when
asked); see also supra Part II.C.2 (providing the background of each case and the removal
issues involved).
144
Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 220 (Tex. App. 2010) (Gaultney, J., concurring); see
supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that Congress enacted section 230 to encourage ISPs to selfregulate by removing then-existing disincentives).
145
Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 292. See supra Part II.C.2 for a more in-depth
discussion of the Friendfinder case.
140
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provision was intended for Good Samaritan ISPs.146 Yet, the law as it
stands does not differentiate between good and bad faith for purposes of
immunity evaluations; therefore, ISPs, such as the one in Friendfinder, are
able to act in bad faith while still reaping the benefits of section 230’s
immunity shield.147 Meanwhile, victims of online defamation are left to
expend time and money litigating the matter with great uncertainty
while their reputations rapidly deteriorate.148
B. The Ineffectiveness of Previously Suggested Remedies
Although critics have recommended using self-help remedies to
mitigate the harmful effects of defamatory speech, such remedies are
often ineffective.149 As illustrated in the case law concerning the CDA,
contacting the ISP and requesting removal of the material often does not
work because ISPs know that they are not required to do so by law.150
Confrontation, while easy and inexpensive, often does not stop the
publications when the individual is anonymous, which is often the
case.151 Furthermore, even if confrontation successfully stops the
publication of further defamatory statements, it does not necessarily

146
311 S.W.3d at 221 (Gaultney J., concurring) (arguing that section 230’s language
indicates that bad faith conduct is not afforded protection by the Act). “By its terms,
section 230(c)(2)(A) protects an action taken in ‘good faith’—that is, with an absence of
malice. A provider that acts maliciously, and that would be held civilly liable under state
law, does not enjoy federal immunity under section 230(c)(2)(A).” Id. Justice Gaultney
asserted that section 230 was intended to protect good faith efforts to remove third-party
defamatory statements, even if such efforts ultimately proved unsuccessful.
Id.
Furthermore, Justice Gaultney contended that “a malicious provider who intentionally and
unreasonably chooses not to remove material that can easily be deleted, and that is known
to be defamatory, should not be immune from civil liability under section 230(c)(2)(A).” Id.
147
See Benedict, supra note 72, at 493 (“The problem is, however, that § 230 does not
require self-policing. These providers can reap all of the benefits and are not required to
perform any of the service Congress hoped to encourage.”).
148
See Miller, supra note 5, at 250 (discussing the difficulties involved with John Doe suits
seeking to compel ISPs to disclose identities); Sheridan, supra note 34, at 178 (recognizing
that litigation is expensive); see also Lipton, supra note 3, at 1131 (explaining that, even if the
plaintiff is able to compel disclosure, the third-party poster is typically unable to satisfy a
judgment).
149
See Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (“[S]elf-help has not been a sufficient deterrent to stop
defamatory posts.”).
150
See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009); Friendfinder,
540 F. Supp. 2d at 292, 298; Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014
(N.Y. 2011).
151
See Areheart, supra note 101, at 42 (explaining that the individual posters are often
anonymous and difficult to track down); Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70 (asserting that
confrontation is the easiest and least expensive remedy).
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result in removal of the existing material to spare the victim’s
reputation.152
Another suggested remedy is counter speech.153 However, once the
lie is available to the public, the mere fact that a victim replies to a
defamatory thread saying “that is false” does not guarantee that
everyone—or anyone for that matter—will believe the victim.154 In fact,
counter speech can and frequently does fuel even more defamatory
discussion.155 Moreover, counter speech alone does not stop the
defamatory material from appearing on search engine sites when
someone searches the victim’s name; therefore, the victim’s reputation
still remains in jeopardy even when the victim uses counter speech.156
While most victims of online defamation would want to know the
identity of the anonymous poster, more importantly, victims typically
want the material removed so as to preserve what is left of their
reputations and avoid further damage in the future.157 The addition of a
notice-and-takedown procedure would thus best serve victims’ interests.
However, the takedown procedure must adequately protect the alleged
defamer’s First Amendment right to free speech, which is a difficult task
to achieve.158

152
Marton et al., supra note 29, at 70. With search engines like Google, victims are
susceptible to long-term harm if the material is not removed. See Ciolli, supra note 2, at 154
(providing an example of a way in which search engines are used to cause harm and
explaining that prospective employers, friends, and others will have access to the material,
which can negatively affect individuals in major aspects of their lives).
153
See Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (discussing whether counter speech is an effective
remedy).
154
See Areheart, supra note 101, at 42 (asserting that victims may attempt to respond;
however, “recent anecdotal evidence . . . suggests this may only make matters worse”);
Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (contending that counter speech is not effective).
155
See Miller, supra note 5, at 236 (explaining that the “victim can suffer more damage for
standing up for himself” because “standing up against a defamer and using online selfhelp may generate even more defamatory comments and hostile reactions from others on
the website or message board”).
156
See id. (asserting that counter speech is not an effective solution to Internet defamation
in the “Google era”); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974)
(asserting that counter speech is an inadequate remedy because it does not suffice to undue
the defamation); Lukmire, supra note 48, at 403 (explaining that counter speech can worsen
the problem because it may cause the material to be displayed more prominently when the
individual’s name is searched on Google).
157
See Lipton, supra note 3, at 1131 (“[T]he plaintiff’s desired remedy will often not be
damages, but rather an injunction to remove a harmful online posting.”); Marton et al.,
supra note 29, at 69 (“[A] very common goal is a desire to prevent continued publication.”).
158
See Hyland, supra note 22, at 84 (“An effective solution must consider the serious
policy implications at stake while remaining consistent with First Amendment
jurisprudence. No commentator appears to have crafted a workable solution that relies on
First Amendment jurisprudence yet also considers the difficult policy issues . . . .”).
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An appealing suggestion that many scholars have offered involves
the adoption of a notice-and-takedown procedure that is almost identical
to OCILLA, which is the DMCA’s takedown provision.159 However,
while some aspects of OCILLA would fit well into section 230—such as
its detailed notification procedure—others would pose complications
that cannot be ignored.160 Specifically, removal upon notification alone
will result in unnecessary censorship if left up to the ISP.161 Even if the
proposed defamation notice-and-takedown procedure requires ISPs to
perform a defamation analysis upon notification and thereafter remove
defamatory material, such a proposal will still be insufficient to protect
the alleged defamer’s free speech interests.162 Because evaluating the
validity of a defamation claim is a difficult task and ISPs would be
immune from suit for removing the material upon notice, ISPs would
likely seek to avoid the risk of liability by removing everything upon
notice regardless of whether the content is illegal, thereby chilling free
One of the most
speech through excessive self-censorship.163
troublesome aspects of this result is that people could effectively use the
procedure as a weapon to silence their critics, even if the speech at issue
would have otherwise received protection.164
159
See, e.g., Hallett, supra note 106, at 279–80; Medenica & Wahab, supra note 13, at 263;
King, supra note 106, at 878. For the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown procedure, see supra
text accompanying notes 107–08.
160
Adamo, supra note 43, at 39–40.
161
See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining the Zeran court’s concern that
liability upon notice would chill free speech because ISPs will elect to remove everything
upon notice, rather than engaging in a defamation analysis). But see Lichtman & Posner,
supra note 55, at 252 (asserting that market forces will discipline overzealous ISP behavior
and “to the extent that any significant externalities remain, tort immunity is not an efficient
response”).
162
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[L]iability upon notice
has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.”); see Areheart, supra note 101, at 44
(referring to the First Amendment as the “elephant in the room” when considering how to
regulate the Internet). See supra Part II.A for information about the First Amendment
interests involved with Internet defamation.
163
See Lewis, supra note 28, at 960 (noting that, if an ISP was faced with notice-based
liability, it would place an ISP in a precarious role because of the difficulty associated with
determining if a comment is defamatory).
164
Hyland, supra note 22, at 83. As one commentator stated:
If interactive web operators are subject to notice-based liability, they
may tend to remove any content that is the subject of a complaint,
thereby pulling some content that is not actually false or defamatory.
This notice-based liability places great power in the hands of any
person who becomes the topic of an uncomplimentary Internet
posting, as a notice to the web operator claiming defamation could
easily result in the removal of the posting.
Id. Similarly, Professor Michael Scott, author of Scott on Information Technology Law,
emphasized:

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/9

Spiccia: The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why Immunity Under Section

2013]

The Best Things in Life Are Not Free

409

One scholar has suggested repealing section 230 completely and
reinstating the three-part common-law framework.165 Similarly, another
academic recommended maintaining protection for publishers but not
However, holding ISPs liable for common-law
distributors.166
distributor liability is problematic because, as with the proposed DMCAlike takedown procedure, ISPs would likely chill free speech with
excessive censorship to avoid liability.167 Alternatively, ISPs would
refrain from monitoring their websites entirely to avoid liability, just as
the ISP did in Cubby.168 Congress introduced the CDA precisely to
discourage this hands-off approach to Internet management.169
Therefore, reinstating the common law framework alone does not
adequately resolve the overall issues moving forward; rather, it merely
sets the law back to the problems that existed nearly two decades ago
when the Stratton and Cubby cases were decided.170 Additionally,
imposing liability based on what the ISP “should have known” would
likely require the ISP to filter through all third-party content, which is

a major problem is that the DMCA take-down provisions have been
abused repeatedly by those who do not like what is being said about
them online—even when it is true and non-infringing. The DMCA
take-down provisions have been used as a means of censoring
discussion on controversial issues, not just for removal of copyright
infringing materials.
Scott, supra note 103, at 66 (footnote omitted).
165
See Jeweler, supra note 36, at 20 (“Congress should repeal the CDA and courts should
apply the common law framework to Internet defamation cases attempting to hold an ISP
or website operator liable under a publisher or distributor liability theory.”).
166
Ferris, supra note 37, at 134.
167
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see French, supra note 36, at 475 (“[W]ebsites might choose
instead to just remove all content that is complained about, without regard to its
offensiveness or the resulting chilling effect on free speech”). But see Jeweler, supra note 36,
at 27 (contending that market forces will prevent ISPs from excessively censoring material).
As one critic emphasized:
liability upon notice presents the triple threat of (1) encouraging
websites to remove any complaint system whereby they might have
knowledge imputed to them, (2) the unbearable burden of considering
every complaint received, and (3) the risk that websites will just
remove all controversial content, thus chilling speech.
French, supra note 36, at 483.
168
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that CompuServe escaped liability because it refrained
from even attempting to filter content); see also French, supra note 36, at 475 (explaining that
distributor liability will likely discourage websites from even attempting to become aware
of the content, and thus websites may refrain from having any system of notification
whatsoever).
169
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of section
230 of the CDA and explaining that Congress sought to encourage ISPs to self-regulate).
170
See supra Part II.C.1 (providing background facts on the Stratton and Cubby cases and
the disincentive these decisions created for ISPs to self-regulate).
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extremely burdensome considering the substantial amount of
communication that occurs on the Internet today.171
A more comprehensive approach than those previously suggested is
necessary to resolve problems involving the absence of an incentive for
ISPs to remove illegal material. The solution must encourage ISPs to
remove illegal material when asked, respect the concerns set out by
Congress and the judiciary, protect the First Amendment interests of the
Internet users, and consider the interests and capabilities of the ISPs.172
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Section 230 of the CDA does not adequately protect the interests of
victims of torts committed on the Internet.173 Additionally, section 230,
as it stands today, does not achieve Congress’s ultimate goal of
encouraging ISPs to remove offensive material online because it gives
ISPs immunity from suit for third-party conduct regardless of whether
the ISPs remove the material or refuse to do so.174 As a result, when
victims request removal of defamatory material on the Internet, ISPs

171
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (“In light of the vast amount of speech communicated
through interactive computer services, these notices could produce an impossible burden
for service providers, who would be faced with ceaseless choices of suppressing
controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability.”); French, supra note 36, at 474
(explaining that, with millions of posts on each website, it is financially burdensome and
unfeasible to monitor the content); see also Katyal, supra note 70, at 1007–08 (asserting that
imposing liability on an ISP for its subscribers’ acts will lead the ISP to remove risky
subscribers from its system).
172
See supra Part II.A (discussing First Amendment rights, such as the right to remain
anonymous and speak freely, so long as the speech does not fall within an unprotected
category, such as defamation); supra Part II.C (explaining that Congress enacted section 230
primarily to encourage ISPs to self-regulate and to remove the disincentives brought on by
the Stratton decision); supra Part II.D (discussing concerns expressed by the judiciary
regarding the absence of a takedown procedure to help victims mitigate harm to their
reputations and the lack of an incentive for ISPs to self-regulate); supra Part III.B
(acknowledging concerns regarding the heavy burden some remedies can impose on ISPs
and recognizing that such burdens can compel ISPs to censor both lawful and unlawful
speech, which infringes on lawful Internet users’ First Amendment interests).
173
See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that section 230 has been construed to remove any
type of notice-based liability and there is no takedown procedure in place, so victims are
left without a method of removing defamatory material from the Internet to mitigate harm
to their reputations).
174
See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that there is no incentive for ISPs to behave like the
Good Samaritans Congress was concerned about when it enacted section 230 because ISPs
have immunity irrespective of whether they self-regulate, so there is no reason for them to
expend resources for self-regulation).
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often do not remove the material because nothing compels them to do
so.175
While scholars have previously suggested repealing or amending
section 230 to include distributor liability or a takedown procedure, the
previously requested modifications still fail to adequately protect the
free speech interests of the anonymous posters and financial interests of
the ISPs; therefore, the concerns raised in Zeran would still remain.176
Consequently, this Note proposes a notice-and-takedown provision for
defamatory material in an effort to more adequately protect: (1) the
individual victims’ interests; (2) the ISPs’ interests; and (3) the
anonymous posters’ right to free speech.177 Rather than leaving the
defamation analysis in the ISPs’ hands, the FCC should designate a
division to complete good faith evaluations of the validity of complaints
from alleged victims and determine whether material complained of
necessitates removal.
A. Proposed Legislation
Section 230A:
Exception to section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act:178
(1) An Internet Service Provider that does not comply with
the procedure set forth in subsection (2) below forfeits the
protection of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
and will thus, be subject to liability for third-party content on
its website or service.
(2) Notice-and-Takedown Procedure:
(A) An individual seeking removal of allegedly
defamatory material on the Internet must send a
notification that complies with subsection (3) of this Act
to the Internet Service Provider as well as the Federal
Communications Commission requesting such removal.
(B) The Internet Service Provider, upon receipt of the
removal notification, must promptly notify the thirdparty poster that:
175
See supra Part II.C.2 (examining cases in which victims repeatedly requested the
removal of unlawful material and the ISPs refused to do so).
176
See supra Part III.B (discussing previously suggested remedies and why they are
ineffective).
177
See supra text accompanying note 172 (explaining the various competing interests
involved).
178
This proposed legislation adds another subsection to section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act. The language of subsection (3)(A) is based off the DMCA’s
notice procedure; however, the author created the remaining subsections.
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(i) The Federal Communications Commission is
evaluating the allegedly defamatory content;
(ii) The agency may require removal of the material;
(iii) The poster’s identity has not been and will not
thereafter be disclosed; and
(iv) The poster, within one (1) week, may provide the
Federal Communications Commission with proof of
the truthfulness of the speech, if available.
(C) The Federal Communications Commission, upon
receipt of the removal notification, must promptly contact
the complaining party to notify him or her that the matter
is under advisement.
(D) The Federal Communications Commission must,
within sixty (60) days, conduct a good faith evaluation of
the requesting party’s claim to determine whether the
material at issue could reasonably be deemed defamatory.
(i) If the Federal Communications Commission
finds that the material at issue could not reasonably
be deemed defamatory, it must notify the party
requesting removal that the material will not be
removed and provide that party with the rationale for
its decision.
(ii) If the Federal Communications Commission
finds that the material at issue could reasonably be
deemed defamatory, it must contact the Internet
Service Provider to recommend removal of the
material.
(E) Upon receipt of a removal recommendation from the
Federal Communications Commission, the Internet
Service Provider must promptly remove the material at
issue or otherwise forfeit, pursuant to subsction (1), the
immunity that section 230 provides.
(3) Elements of Removal Request Notification:
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification
requesting removal of third-party material from the
Internet must include the following:
(i) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the
service provider and agency to contact the
complaining party, such as the complaining party’s
name, address, telephone number, and, if available,
an electronic mail address;
(ii) A copy of the allegedly defamatory material;
(iii) The precise location of the allegedly defamatory
material;
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(iv) A signed statement from the individual
providing, under penalty of perjury, that the material
he or she has provided is accurate and that he or she
reasonably believes the material at issue is
defamatory;
(v) Any documentation, if available, that would
prove the falsity of the material at issue; and
(vi) Payment of $500.00.
(B) Failure to comply with the notice requirements set
forth in subsection (3)(A) will result in automatic denial
of an individual’s removal request.
B. Commentary
First, the alleged victim should send her complaint to the ISP as well
as the designated FCC division responsible for analyzing defamatory
content on the Internet. Once the agency receives the written complaint,
it must e-mail the complaining party to notify her that the matter is
under advisement. Similarly, once the ISP receives the complaint, it
must notify the poster of the material that a government agency is
evaluating the content of his speech and that the agency may require
removal of the material. In its notification to the poster, the ISP should
inform him that the ISP has not disclosed his identity and that if he
wants to fight to keep the material up, he can provide the agency with
proof of the truthfulness of the speech or argue that the speech is merely
an opinion, so long as he does so within one week. If the agency finds
that the material could not be deemed defamatory, it will e-mail the
complaining party informing her that it will not request that the ISP
remove the material and providing a reason for its decision.
There may be some scenarios where the determination of whether
material is defamatory is unclear; therefore, if the FCC finds that the
material could reasonably be deemed defamatory, it must notify the ISP,
and the ISP must remove the material immediately. So long as the ISP
complies with the procedure, it will retain its immunity. However, if the
ISP does not comply with the procedure—i.e. refuses to remove the
material after notification from the agency of the defamatory nature of
the speech—then it will forfeit its ability to avail itself of section 230’s
immunity. Immunity should not be freely given regardless of the ISP’s
actions; rather, immunity should be earned through compliance with the
proposed notice-and-takedown procedure.
The proposed notice-and-takedown procedure is superior to
previously suggested remedies for several reasons. First, it provides a
cost-effective and efficient way for victims to mitigate the damage to

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9

414

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

their reputations by providing an alternative to costly litigation. Second,
by leaving the analysis and decision-making to an impartial government
agency with knowledge of the law, the alleged defamer’s First
Amendment rights will receive adequate protection. This is because the
FCC will not require that ISPs remove material unless the agency first
deems the speech defamatory; therefore, ISPs will not feel compelled to
remove everything upon request from alleged victims. Third, the
proposed statute preserves the alleged defamer’s anonymity throughout
the process, further protecting his First Amendment rights.179
Specifically, subsections 2(A)–(B) serve, in part, to ensure preservation of
the alleged defamer’s anonymity by providing a process in which the
FCC has no direct contact with the anonymous poster and is not
informed of the individual’s identity.180 Rather, the agency’s interactions
will be limited solely to the ISP and the complainant. Fourth, because
subsection (3)(A)(iv) subjects the complaining party to the possibility of
perjury charges, there will likely be minimal frivolous complaints.181
Fifth, the procedure is not overly burdensome to ISPs because it does not
require that ISPs screen for offensive content or evaluate complaints.
Last, although the proposed takedown procedure requires government
interference, the agency is merely an impartial middleman, so the
government is not overly involved.
Critics of the proposed notice-and-takedown procedure will likely
argue that the government cannot afford to allocate time and financial
resources for the FCC to evaluate potential claims. However, although
this is a valid concern, the fee imposed by subsection (3)(A)(vi) seeks to
alleviate the financial burden on the FCC.182 Notably, it prevents the
burden from falling on the taxpayers. Conversely, critics may take issue
with the imposition of a $500 fee on an innocent victim seeking to have
the material removed. An alternative would be a conditional fee, in
which the FCC would return the $500 if the material complained of
necessitates removal and would retain the fee if the content at issue does
not necessitate removal. One benefit of a conditional fee is that it will
help to discourage frivolous claims. However, the conditional fee option
could cause problems if the agency does not retain enough money to
179
See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing the First Amendment right to
publish anonymously).
180
See supra subsections 2(A)–(B) of the proposed legislation, requiring that the
anonymous third-party poster receive notice from the ISP rather than the FCC, thus
ensuring that the FCC is never informed of the individual’s identity.
181
See supra subsection 3(A)(iv) of the proposed legislation, directing the complaining
party to sign a statement, under penalty of perjury, indicating the material is defamatory.
182
See supra subsection (3)(A)(vi) of the proposed notice-and-takedown procedure,
which imposes a $500 fee on the complaining party.
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continue evaluating claims without financial assistance from the
government. Additionally, the financial motivation could negatively
influence removal decisions. While it is unfortunate that a victim may
have to pay a fee to have unlawful material removed from the Internet, it
is important to note that this notice-and-takedown procedure is a more
cost-effective and reliable alternative to litigation, which is typically
expensive and risky.183
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted section 230 of the CDA primarily to encourage
ISPs to self-regulate and remove offensive material from the Internet by
eliminating the disincentives that emerged after the Cubby and Stratton
cases.184 However, the broad judicial construction of section 230,
immunizing ISPs from liability for almost all third-party content, has
prompted the same disincentive Congress sought to eliminate.185 The
mere fact that Congress eliminated a disincentive does not conversely
mean that Congress created an incentive. The evisceration of distributor
liability on the Internet as well as the lack of procedures or consequences
for ISP refusal to remove offensive material has left many individuals
with little or no adequate methods of having the material removed to
mitigate the damage to their reputations. The proposed notice-andtakedown procedure is an effective solution to this problem because it
finally provides a real incentive for ISPs to remove offensive material,
yet it also adequately protects the interests of the ISPs and anonymous
posters.
Considering the scenario set out in Part I, the law as it stands today
leaves Barbra with no recourse against JuicyCollegeDirt.com when it
refuses to remove messages on its website which allege, among other
things, that Barbra has sexually transmitted diseases and engages in
sexual misconduct by cheating on her significant other. This result is
completely at odds with Congress’s ultimate purpose in enacting section
230. An adoption of the proposed notice-and-takedown procedure
would produce the type of results Congress sought to achieve in
enacting section 230.
With the proposed notice-and-takedown
183
See supra note 101 (examining the challenges involved in litigation, such as the
expense, difficulty compelling disclosure of the anonymous individual, and likelihood that
the defendant will not be able to satisfy the judgment).
184
See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (explaining that Cubby and Stratton
created a disincentive because taken together, they stood for the proposition that, if ISPs
attempt to filter content, they will be held liable as publishers).
185
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (asserting that immunity from suit does not
encourage ISPs to self-regulate).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 9

416

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

procedure, Barbra would have a swift and cost-effective process for
seeking removal of the defamatory material.
In evaluating the victim’s removal request regarding the
JuicyCollegeDirt.com postings, the FCC would likely determine that the
messages—especially those related to criminal acts, sexual misconduct,
and sexually transmitted diseases—are likely defamatory and
recommend that JuicyCollegeDirt.com remove the messages promptly.186
Upon
receipt
of
the
FCC’s
removal
recommendation,
JuicyCollegeDirt.com would likely remove the messages to ensure that
the website remains protected from liability for the third-party content.
If JuicyCollegeDirt.com fails to remove the material or refuses to do so, it
will be subject to liability as if it had written the defamatory messages
itself. Because JuicyCollegeDirt.com has a deeper pocket, it will be a
lawsuit worth pursuing regardless of the financial obstacles Barbra is
faced with. Either way, Barbra will finally have a cost-effective and
reliable method of repairing the damage to her reputation.
Patricia Spiccia∗

186
See supra note 33 (explaining that imputations of criminal or sexual misconduct and
loathsome disease constitution defamation per se).
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